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NOTES
SNAP JUDGMENT:
RECOGNIZING THE PROPRIETY AND PITFALLS
OF DIRECT JUDICIAL REVIEW
OF AUDIOVISUAL EVIDENCE
AT SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Denise K. Barry*
Conflicting results in two recent police excessive force decisions by the
U.S. Supreme Court—Tolan v. Cotton and Plumhoff v. Rickard—have sown
confusion about the standards for summary judgment. This Note shows
how the two decisions are consistent with each other and with longstanding
summary judgment precedents. The key insight is that since the Second
Circuit’s iconic 1946 decision in Arnstein v. Porter, appellate judges,
including Supreme Court Justices, have listened to audio recordings,
scrutinized artwork, and—as in the case of Plumhoff—watched video
footage in order to decide for themselves whether there is a genuine issue of
material fact for trial. These “objective” components of the record are
considered vitally important to the decisions. When no objective evidence
is available, appellate judges are left with “he said, she said” testimonial
evidence in which demeanor evidence looms larger and are therefore more
likely to allow the cases to proceed to trial. The presumed propriety of
appellate judicial review of audiovisual evidence not only explains the
different results in Tolan (no audiovisual evidence of police shooting and
vacating the lower court’s finding for the defendant officer) and Plumhoff
(video evidence of a police car chase resulting in the Court finding for the
officer), but it also will have greater significance in current police
excessive force cases given the omnipresence of smartphones and police
recordings. At the same time, it is worth questioning whether appellate
judges should continue to exercise limitless, de novo review of present-day
audiovisual evidence, which may require as much understanding of context
as traditional demeanor evidence.

* J.D. Candidate, 2016, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2002, University of
Pennsylvania. I would like to thank Professor Thomas H. Lee for his guidance and advice
during the writing process. I would like to thank my family for their love and
encouragement, and especially John, for his support through everything, law school and
beyond.
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INTRODUCTION
In May 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down two decisions
involving complaints of excessive force by police officers where the
officers had moved for summary judgment1 on the basis of qualified
immunity.2 Tolan v. Cotton3 and Plumhoff v. Rickard4 both had tragic facts
and circumstances, and the confrontations between the plaintiffs and the
police ended in permanent disability in Tolan5 and in two deaths in
Plumhoff.6 In Tolan, the Court vacated the lower court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of the defendant police officer.7 Because it was the first
time in ten years that the Court had ruled against an officer in a case
involving summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, civil rights
advocates celebrated Tolan as a small but notable victory.8 By contrast, in
Plumhoff, the Court reversed the lower courts, which had both denied
summary judgment to the defendant officer on qualified immunity
grounds.9
This Note proposes that the key to understanding these two seemingly
inconsistent cases is the importance of audiovisual evidence and the
presumptive right of appellate judges, including U.S. Supreme Court

1. Summary judgment is “granted on a claim or defense about which there is no
genuine issue of material fact and on which the movant is entitled to prevail as a matter of
law. . . . This procedural device allows the speedy disposition of a controversy without the
need for trial.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1664 (10th ed. 2014).
2. Qualified immunity is a “judicially-created doctrine that often protects public
officials from damages actions for the violation of constitutional rights.” Alan K. Chen, The
Facts About Qualified Immunity, 55 EMORY L.J. 229, 229 (2006). The test for qualified
immunity is two pronged, and inquires first “whether the facts, ‘[t]aken in the light most
favorable to the party asserting the injury, . . . show the officer’s conduct violated a [federal]
right.’” Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1865 (2013) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.
194, 201 (2001)). The second prong asks “whether the right in question was ‘clearly
established’ at the time of the violation.” Id. at 1866 (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730,
739 (2002)).
3. 134 S. Ct. 1861 (2014).
4. 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014).
5. See Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 1864.
6. See Plumhoff, 134 S. Ct. at 2018.
7. See Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 1868.
8. See Will Baude, Tolan v. Cotton—When Should the Supreme Court Interfere in
‘Factbound’ Cases?, WASH. POST (May 7, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/05/07/tolan-v-cotton-when-should-the-supreme-court-interferein-factbound-cases; Garrett Epps, Supreme Court: Police Can’t Brutalize Your Elderly
Mother, ATLANTIC (May 8, 2014, 2:17 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/
archive/2014/05/supreme-court-police-cant-brutalize-your-elderly-mother-or-shoot-youwhen-youre-unarmed/361934/; Maxwell S. Kennerly, The Supreme Court’s ResultsOriented Summary Judgment Precedent, LITIGATION&TRIAL.COM (June 6, 2014),
http://www.litigationandtrial.com/2014/06/articles/attorney/civil-rights-1/results-orientedsummary-judgment/.
9. See Plumhoff, 134 S. Ct. at 2024; Estate of Allen v. City of W. Memphis, 509 F.
App’x 388, 392 (6th Cir. 2012), rev’d sub nom. Plumhoff, 134 S. Ct. 2012; Estate of Allen v.
City of W. Memphis, Nos. 05-2489, 05-2585, 2011 WL 197426, at *9–10 (W.D. Tenn. Jan.
20, 2011), aff’d, 509 F. App’x 388 (6th Cir. 2012), rev’d sub nom. Plumhoff, 134 S. Ct.
2012.
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Justices, to review such evidence de novo10 when reviewing a trial court’s
grant or denial of summary judgment. In Tolan, the record on appellate
review was completely testimonial, while in Plumhoff, the record included
video recordings of the confrontation between the plaintiff and the police.
In cases where the record includes audiovisual evidence pertaining to
disputed factual or mixed factual issues (e.g., whether the use of force by
police is reasonable under the circumstances), appellate judges have
consistently gone to the record and decided for themselves whether there is
a genuine issue of material fact that makes the case trial worthy. When the
record is purely testimonial—the “he said, she said” kinds of cases—
appellate judges are more likely to view the facts in the plaintiff’s favor and
to allow the case to proceed.
Two iconic decisions set the foundation for this key distinction between
testimonial and audiovisual evidence at summary judgment. The key
precedent for the Tolan decision is the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1970 decision
Adickes v. S.H. Kress,11 the quintessential “he said, she said” summary
judgment case.12 Plumhoff’s antecedent is the 1946 decision of a
distinguished panel of Second Circuit judges in Arnstein v. Porter.13 The
majority in Arnstein, over the objection of Judge Charles E. Clark, the
former dean of Yale Law School and the principal architect of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure,14 held that there was a genuine issue of material
fact for trial in a copyright infringement case after listening to the musical
recordings in dispute.15 Tolan, like Adickes, was remanded for trial because
it was a testimonial case. Plumhoff was summarily decided by the Justices
after they independently assessed the video evidence in the case, just as the
Arnstein court had listened to the audio evidence (albeit to a different
result).
This Note explores the contours of the longstanding appellate practice of
evaluating “objective” audiovisual evidence on summary judgment motions
and argues that this practice—and the Justices’ questionable confidence in
their own powers of perception—led to opposing results in Tolan and
Plumhoff. Part I explores the modern history and development of summary
judgment and, using landmark summary judgment cases, examines courts’
routine assessment of audiovisual evidence in rendering summary judgment
decisions. Part II examines the Tolan and Plumhoff decisions in detail and
briefly reviews their effects on lower court cases. Part III continues this
analysis by illustrating how Tolan and Plumhoff can be reconciled by
10. De novo translates to “anew,” and means that an appellate court will review the
record and any evidence without deference to the trial court’s decision. See BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 528, 976 (10th ed. 2014).
11. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
12. The record in Adickes consisted entirely of witness testimony. See id. at 153–58.
13. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
14. See Michael E. Smith, Judge Charles E. Clark and The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 85 YALE. L.J. 914, 915 (1976); see also Fred Rodell, For Charles E. Clark: A
Brief and Belated But Fond Farewell, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1323 (1965) (noting that as
dean, Clark revolutionized legal education).
15. See Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 469, 473.
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acknowledging the Court’s dispositive resort to audiovisual evidence in the
Plumhoff record. Part III concludes by urging judges reviewing a record to
recognize the limits of their own powers of cognition in assessing
deceptively objective audiovisual evidence.
I. THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Part I of this Note examines the history and development of summary
judgment. Part I.A addresses the origin and purpose of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, particularly the purpose and function of Rule 56, which
governs summary judgment in federal courts. Part I.B examines the
“slightest doubt” standard employed by courts prior to 1986 and looks to
two landmark cases, noting the courts’ treatment of the record in their
decisions. Part I.C goes on to examine the summary judgment “trilogy” of
1986—important Supreme Court opinions that changed the standard by
which courts analyze summary judgment motions. Part I.D looks at three
post-trilogy decisions, two copyright infringement cases in which courts
based their decisions on the objective record, and then Scott v. Harris,16 a
summary judgment qualified immunity decision where video played a
starring role in the Supreme Court’s opinion. Part I.E concludes with a
survey of the responses to the summary judgment trilogy and the use of
visual images or audiovisual recordings in courts’ decisions.
A. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Enactment and Purpose
In 1938, the Supreme Court adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(“the Rules”), Rule 56 of which governs summary judgment.17 As stated
by the Rules Committee, “[T]he very mission of the summary judgment
procedure is to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see
whether there is a genuine need for trial.”18 When a party moves for
summary judgment, it asserts that “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”19

16. 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
17. Adam N. Steinman, The Irrepressible Myth of Celotex: Reconsidering Summary
Judgment Burdens Twenty Years After the Trilogy, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 81, 88 (2006).
Summary judgment has its roots in the common law and was first used in England in 1855.
Id. Several states in the United States adopted summary judgment by the end of the
nineteenth century, and plaintiffs used it on a very limited basis to eliminate “frivolous or
fictitious Defences.” Id. Summary judgment was not considered a defendant’s tool. Id.
18. See id. at 91 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56 advisory committee’s note (1963
amendment)). The text of the current Rule states:
A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense—or
the part of each claim or defense—on which summary judgment is sought. The
court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. The court should state on the record the reasons for granting or denying the
motion.
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
19. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
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The goal of Rule 56, and of the Rules as a whole, is “the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”20
Rule 56 itself provides no specific guidance on how courts should
determine “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact,” and instead relies on courts to develop these details.21
Because of this lack of direction, judicial interpretation of Rule 56 has
played an extremely important role in its development.22 As one
commentator explains, “The Rule 56 text has endured because its seemingly
indeterminate standard is problematic only if the text is viewed apart from
the common-law system in which it operates.”23 The common law,
anchored by the “iconic rule text,” emerges slowly over time through cases
on a variety of subject matters, and works to rein in “unguided judicial
discretion . . . . It is that combination that makes Rule 56 . . . endure and
function across a variety of subject matters and of factual patterns within
the same subject matter.”24
Although Rule 56 has been amended multiple times since its adoption,
including substantive textual changes, commentators note that all of the
changes “were designed to bring the rule in line with reality, to permit the
text to reflect the manner that summary judgment actually operates.”25
Because Rule 56’s intentionally protean standard left so much room for
judicial interpretation, a close parsing of the case law is the best way to
understand the evolution of the summary judgment standard.26
B. The “Slightest Doubt” Standard on Summary Judgment Motions
In the years immediately after the adoption of the Rules, courts were
hesitant to grant summary judgment to defendants, opting instead to send a
case to the jury if there was the “slightest doubt” about material facts.27
The standard originated in the Second Circuit’s 1945 decision in Doehler
Metal Furniture Co. v. United States.28 The Second Circuit explained “that
20. Id. 1.
21. Steinman, supra note 17, at 89.
22. Lee H. Rosenthal, The Summary Judgment Changes That Weren’t, 43 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 471, 495–96 (2012).
23. Id. at 495.
24. Id. at 495–96.
25. EDWARD J. BRUNET & MARTIN H. REDISH, SUMMARY JUDGMENT: FEDERAL LAW AND
PRACTICE xiii (Supp. 2012). Specifically, the 1963 amendment added answers to
interrogatories as items courts can consider in granting a summary judgment motion. See
Steinman, supra note 17, at 89 n.48. In 2007, Rule 56 received a “stylistic overhaul,” in line
with the stylistic changes that all of the Rules received, without substantive changes. See
BRUNET & REDISH, supra, at xiii. The 2009 and 2010 amendments included reordering Rule
56 so that the “no genuine dispute as to any material fact” language begins the Rule, rather
than coming after the timing requirements; incorporating into the text the procedures of
partial summary judgment and sua sponte summary judgment; and codifying that a court
should set forth its reasons for granting or denying summary judgment in an opinion. See id.
at xxi–xxiii.
26. See Rosenthal, supra note 22, at 498.
27. EDWARD J. BRUNET & MARTIN H. REDISH, SUMMARY JUDGMENT: FEDERAL LAW AND
PRACTICE § 6:3, at 127–28 (3d ed. 2006 & Supp. 2012).
28. 149 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1945).
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trial judges should exercise great care in granting motions for summary
judgment,” and that “[a] litigant has a right to a trial where there is the
slightest doubt as to the facts.”29 The court cautioned that although
summary
judgment
could
be
“a
praiseworthy
time-saving
device, . . . prompt despatch of judicial business” is “neither the sole nor the
primary purpose for which courts have been established.”30 The court
concluded that “[d]enial of a trial on disputed facts is worse than delay.”31
The Second Circuit coined the term “slightest doubt” after relying on the
Supreme Court’s analysis in Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp.,32 which
held that Rule 56 only allowed summary judgment “where it is quite clear
what the truth is.”33 The Supreme Court further stated that “the purpose of
the rule is not to cut litigants off from their right of trial by jury if they
really have issues to try.”34 The “slightest doubt” standard was viewed as a
sensible restraint given the overhang of the constitutional right to a jury in a
civil trial and general enthusiasm about the democratic advantages of a jury
trial, even in the civil context.35
1. Arnstein v. Porter: An Early Examination of the Audio Record
The landmark case exemplifying the “slightest doubt” standard is the
Second Circuit’s 1946 decision in Arnstein v. Porter, decided by an
esteemed panel consisting of Judges Learned Hand, Jerome Frank, and
Charles E. Clark.36 In Arnstein, the plaintiff, a musical composer, appealed
from the lower court’s grant of summary judgment to the famous composer
Cole Porter, whom Arnstein had sued for copyright infringement for
copying his music.37 The action consisted of two elements: (1) that Porter
had copied the work and, (2) assuming that the work had been copied, that
the copying went so far as to be an improper appropriation of Arnstein’s
copyrighted work.38 The court explained that in order to prove the first
element, there must be evidence of copying, either in the form of an
admission by the defendant, or by a finding of (1) a similarity between the

29. Id. at 135 (emphasis added).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. 321 U.S. 620 (1944).
33. Id. at 627.
34. Id.
35. See BRUNET & REDISH, supra note 27, § 6:3, at 136–37.
36. See id. § 6:3, at 128 (citing Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946)); Alan K.
Chen, The Burdens of Qualified Immunity: Summary Judgment and the Role of Facts in
Constitutional Tort Law, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 63 (1997) (explaining that federal courts have
relied on the “oft-cited” case of Arnstein, which held that even if the nonmoving party has no
evidence to rebut the moving party’s evidence, summary judgment may not be granted if
there exists the “slightest doubt” that there is a genuine dispute of material fact). For
additional examples of the general hostility toward summary judgment in federal courts at
this time, see Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary
Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 77–78 (1990).
37. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468.
38. Id.
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copyrighted material and the alleged copy and (2) evidence that the
defendant had access to the copyrighted material.39
If the plaintiff established the copying element, then the court would test
the improper appropriation element by using the standard of an “ordinary
lay hearer.”40 The court was clear that “[e]ach of these two issues—
copying and improper appropriation—is an issue of fact. If there is a trial,
the conclusions on those issues [are for] the trier of the facts.”41
Nevertheless, in order to determine whether the fact-finder should be
permitted to make these findings, the judges listened to the recordings
themselves, holding that the similarities between the recordings, standing
alone, were not so dispositively compelling as to permit the inference of
copying.42 However, the court did hold that the similarities were sufficient
enough to the judges’ ears that the case should go to trial, assuming there
was sufficient evidence of Porter’s access to Arnstein’s compositions.43
Therefore, Porter’s summary judgment motion was dependent on Arnstein’s
evidence that Porter had access to Arnstein’s compositions.44 The court
held that summary judgment should only be granted if it was clear that
Porter absolutely did not have access to the compositions at issue.45
Reviewing the record before it, the Second Circuit noted that the district
court had depositions from Arnstein and Porter regarding the access Porter
may or may not have had to Arnstein’s compositions.46 The Second Circuit
stated that issues of credibility must always be left to the jury, recognizing
that if, after listening to the testimony of both parties, the jury did not
believe Porter’s denials, it could “reasonably infer access . . . . It follows
that, as credibility is unavoidably involved, a genuine issue of material fact
presents itself.”47 The court further explained that cross-examination at
trial in front of the fact-finder was an important tool for determining
credibility, for which depositions were a poor substitute.48 On this issue,
the court held that summary judgment should not be granted.49
The court went on to examine the second element of the action, whether
to the “ears of lay listeners,” Porter appropriated something that belonged to
Arnstein.50 Stating that this was a question of fact properly suited for the
jury, the court listened to the compositions and held that it did not find the
similarities in the pieces so “trifling” as to find for the defendant Porter.51
Based on its own assessment of the audio evidence and acknowledging that
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 469.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 469–70.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 472–73.
51. Id. at 473. The court in dicta went so far as to suggest that in the case of a bench
trial, the judge should employ an “advisory jury” to help determine this issue. Id.
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Arnstein’s testimony might be convincing to a jury, the court held that it
could not grant summary judgment for Porter.52
The Second Circuit judges therefore independently evaluated the
compositions for their similarities—a question for the fact-finder—while
also advocating that testimonial disputes are for the jury’s determination.53
Judge Clark’s dissent is notable not only for its disapproval of the
majority’s “dislike of the summary-judgment rule,”54 but also for its
position that the court was mistaken in deciding the issue of improper
copying using “the judicial eardrum [that] may be peculiarly insensitive.”55
Clark declared that the majority’s rejection of expert testimony as “utterly
immaterial” in determining whether the songs were copied constituted
“final proof of the anti-intellectual and book-burning nature of [the
majority’s] decision.”56 Judge Clark, advocating for the use of expert
witnesses to determine copying in musical copyright infringement cases,
was equally skeptical of the lay jury’s role as a fact-finder, thinking they
lacked competence.57 He concluded that if judges and juries were to listen
to musical compositions themselves to determine plagiarism, judicial and
musical “chaos” would result.58
2. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.:
Establishing Burdens with Testimonial Evidence
In the seminal 1970 civil rights case of Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., the
Supreme Court denied the defendant summary judgment because he had
“the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue as to any of material
fact.”59 Further, according to the Court, the defendant had failed to
foreclose the possibility that the jury could find for the plaintiff.60 Because
Adickes placed a high burden on the moving party, the case can be seen as
reaffirming the Supreme Court’s approval of the “slightest doubt” test and
exhibiting a preference for jury trial over summary judgment. Some
commentators have opined that this may have been due to the civil rights
context of the case.61
52. Id.
53. See generally id.
54. Id. at 479 (Clark, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 476.
56. Id. at 478.
57. Id. at 478–79.
58. Id. at 480.
59. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). In addition to its
significance as a civil rights case, Adickes is widely regarded as a landmark summary
judgment opinion. See John E. Kennedy, Federal Summary Judgment: Reconciling Celotex
v. Catrett with Adickes v. Kress and the Evidentiary Problems Under Rule 56, 6 REV. LITIG.
227, 229 (1987) (describing the “landmark” case); Linda S. Mullenix, Summary Judgment:
Taming the Beast of Burdens, 10 AM. J. TRIAL. ADVOC. 433, 439 (1987) (calling Adickes one
of the Supreme Court’s most important cases on summary judgment).
60. Adickes, 398 U.S. at 158.
61. See 10B Charles Alan WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2739, at 393 (3d ed. 1998) (“[T]here may be some question
whether Adickes would have been decided the same way if it had been a routine tort or
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In Adickes, a white school teacher brought a claim against Kress, the
owner of a restaurant in Hattiesburg, Mississippi, to recover damages under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of her constitutional rights.62 Adickes went
to Kress’s restaurant with six African American students; the restaurant
served the students but refused to serve Adickes.63 Upon leaving the
restaurant, the Hattiesburg police arrested Adickes for vagrancy.64
Adickes alleged that Kress and the police had conspired to deprive her of
her right to equal treatment and to cause her arrest for the false charge of
vagrancy.65 According to Adickes’s complaint, a police officer came into
the restaurant and observed her being refused service, and then he and
another officer later arrested her on the street once she left the restaurant.66
Adickes argued that, although she had no knowledge of an agreement
between a restaurant employee and the police, “the sequence of events
created a substantial enough possibility of a conspiracy to allow her to
proceed to trial.”67 The crux of the claim was that the police officer had
been in the restaurant and that his mere presence was enough for a
reasonable fact-finder to infer a conspiracy between restaurant staff and the
police.68
In his motion for summary judgment, Kress argued that the facts
established that there was no agreement between himself and the police.69
In support of this assertion, Kress submitted a deposition from the store
manager stating that he had not communicated with the police and that he
had ordered the waitress to refuse Adickes service for fear of starting a riot
if Adickes was served.70 Kress also submitted affidavits from the
Hattiesburg chief of police and the two arresting officers, all denying that
anyone in the restaurant had requested that Adickes be arrested.71
Adickes’s opposing evidence consisted of an unsworn statement by a
cashier at the restaurant that the cashier had seen the police officer in the

contract case, rather than a civil-rights suit . . . .”); see also Jack H. Friedenthal, Cases on
Summary Judgment: Has There Been a Material Change in Standards?, 63 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 770, 779 (1988) (“Adickes can be explained in that it was an important civil rights case
that the Court did not want to dispose of without trial. The discussion of summary judgment
was simply a means of masking a difficult substantive issue.”).
62. Adickes, 398 U.S. at 146. Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 states, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
63. Adickes, 398 U.S. at 146–47.
64. Id. at 146.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 156–57.
67. Id. at 157.
68. See Kennedy, supra note 59, at 235.
69. Adickes, 398 U.S. at 153.
70. Id. at 153–54.
71. Id. at 154–55.
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restaurant while Adickes and her students were there,72 as well as Adickes’s
assertions in her complaint and deposition that the officer was at the
restaurant while she and her students were there.73 Adickes stated that
although she had not personally seen the police officer, two of her students
had, and both had testified to this at an earlier trial.74 Despite this
(inadmissible) evidence, Adickes pointed out that Kress had failed to
dispute that the police officer had been in the restaurant.75 The Court found
this failure to dispute the police officer’s presence fatal to Kress’s motion
because, as the moving party, Kress had the burden of showing the absence
of a genuine issue as to any material fact, and, viewing the record in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party, it was possible that the police
officer had been in the restaurant and party to a conspiracy.76 Although not
quoting the phrase “slightest doubt,” the Court’s language implied a “fairly
high burden on parties moving for summary judgment.”77
Adickes also underscores the differences between the burdens of the
parties in a motion for summary judgment as opposed to a motion for a
directed verdict.78 A directed verdict is “[a] ruling by a trial judge taking a
case from the jury because the evidence will permit only one reasonable
verdict.”79 If this dispute had occurred during the trial instead of during the
pretrial stage, Adickes would have the burden of production,80 which is the
“duty to introduce enough evidence on an issue to have the issue decided by
the fact-finder.”81 The significance of these burdens is that if the case had
gone to trial, Kress would have been granted a directed verdict without
producing any evidence of his own, provided that Adickes failed to meet
her burden of production.82 Instead, although Adickes had not met the
burden of production, Kress’s motion for summary judgment was denied
because Kress had failed to disclose the possibility that Adickes could meet
that burden.83
72. Id. at 156 n.14.
73. Id. at 156.
74. Id. at 156 n.13. Adickes had brought two § 1983 claims against Kress: the
conspiracy claim, which was disposed of pretrial on a motion for summary judgment, and a
claim that she had been deprived of service because of “discriminatory custom.” Id. at 147–
48. The latter claim went to trial and was held for Kress on a directed verdict. Id. One
commentator notes that the trial on the discriminatory custom claim put the Supreme Court
in an awkward position, and could possibly influence how Adickes should be understood,
because at the trial Adickes had presented evidence sufficient to support the conspiracy
count. Kennedy, supra note 59, at 234 n.22. Therefore, if the Court granted summary
judgment for Kress, it would be holding Adickes’ evidence insufficient, which had already
been admitted at trial. Id.
75. Adickes, 398 U.S. at 156.
76. See id. at 157.
77. Chen, supra note 36, at 58 (emphasis added).
78. See BRUNET & REDISH, supra note 27, § 5:3, at 94.
79. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1791 (10th ed. 2014).
80. See BRUNET & REDISH, supra note 27, § 5:3, at 94.
81. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 236 (10th ed. 2014).
82. See BRUNET & REDISH, supra note 27, § 5:3, at 94.
83. See id.; Martin H. Redish, Summary Judgment and the Vanishing Trial:
Implications of the Litigation Matrix, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1329, 1342–43 (2005) (explaining
that “[f]or all practical purposes,” although Adickes would have the burden of production at
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In sum, Adickes held that Kress, the moving party, had the initial burden
of demonstrating that there was no genuine dispute of material fact.84
Additionally, when reviewing the arguments set forth by the movant, all
facts and inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party.85 Because Kress “failed to show conclusively that a fact
alleged by [Adickes] was ‘not susceptible’ of an interpretation that might
give rise to an inference of conspiracy,” the burden of producing evidence
never shifted to Adickes.86
C. The Summary Judgment Trilogy and the Emergence of a New Standard
Sixteen years later, in 1986, the Supreme Court decided three summary
judgment cases—known as the trilogy—which are widely regarded as
effecting a sea change in summary judgment doctrine.87 The result was a
purposeful retreat from the anti-summary judgment approach so clear in
Arnstein and Adickes.88
1. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett: Lightening the Movant’s Burden
The Supreme Court’s decision in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett89 altered the
evidentiary burdens on the respective parties on a motion for summary
judgment from those that the Court had earlier endorsed in Adickes.90 In
this wrongful death case, the Supreme Court addressed the purpose of the
summary judgment motion, noting that courts should not regard summary
judgment as a “disfavored procedural shortcut” and must uphold the rights
of defendants to avoid an unnecessary trial where the case is devoid of any
factual basis.91
The Court explained that Adickes should not “be construed to mean that
the burden is on the party moving for summary judgment to produce
evidence showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, even with
respect to an issue on which the nonmoving party bears the burden of
the trial, she could produce “absolutely no evidence that a jury could ever see to support that
allegation” at the summary judgment stage, and further noting that, at trial, Kress could point
out Adickes’s lack of evidence and be granted a directed verdict).
84. Mullenix, supra note 59, at 441.
85. Adickes v. S.H. Kress, 398 U.S. 144, 158–59 (1970).
86. See Mullenix, supra note 59, at 445 (quoting Adickes, 398 U.S. at 160 n.22).
87. See, e.g., Chen, supra note 36, at 58; Friedenthal, supra note 61, at 771; Issacharoff
& Loewenstein, supra note 36, at 73.
88. Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,”
“Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial
Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 1028 (2003) (noting that “the 1986 Supreme Court
trilogy is striking because of the strong pro-summary judgment language found throughout
the Court’s three opinions”). Miller goes on to propose that “the mere fact that the Court
discussed the motion in depth in three cases during the same Term makes the trilogy
significant, suggesting that the subject may well have been on the agenda of some of the
Justices,” and concludes that “there is no doubt that the decisions break with the Court’s
prior attitude in . . . Adickes.” Id. at 1028–29.
89. 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
90. See Issacaroff & Loewenstein, supra note 36, at 79.
91. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327.
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proof.”92 Instead, after adequate time for discovery, a motion for summary
judgment should be granted “against a party who fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”93
Further, the moving party does not have to support its motions with
evidence; it is sufficient for the moving party to inform a court of the basis
for its motion in the record, including the nonmoving party’s lack of
evidence.94
In sum, because under Celotex the movant must simply point to the
nonmovant’s lack of evidence in the record, the burden on the movant is
generally accepted as “light,” as compared to the movant’s burden under
Adickes.95
2. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.:
Equating Summary Judgment to Judgment As a Matter of Law
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.96 equated the summary judgment
standard to the standard for a judgment as a matter of law (formerly called a
directed verdict).97 Additionally, Anderson held that a court must evaluate
the issue of the genuine dispute of material fact in light of the evidentiary
burden that the party would carry as established by the substantive law.98
In Anderson, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant magazine libeled
him, and the issue for the Court was whether the heightened evidentiary
standard required by the substantive libel law—clear and convincing
evidence99 of actual malice—should affect a judge’s weighing of a motion
for summary judgment.100 Framed another way, the question was whether
a movant should get a bonus at the summary judgment stage because the
nonmovant faced a tougher standard at trial.101 The Court affirmatively
stated that a trial judge must “bear in mind the actual quantum and quality
of proof necessary to support liability” and consider a heightened

92. Id. at 325.
93. Id. at 322.
94. Id. at 323.
95. See BRUNET & REDISH, supra note 27, § 5:8, at 118.
96. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
97. See BRUNET & REDISH, supra note 27, § 6:4, at 147–48; Chen, supra note 36, at 64.
98. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254 (1986).
99. “Clear and convincing evidence” is defined as “[e]vidence indicating that the thing
to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 674 (10th
ed. 2014).
100. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247.
101. See id. at 266–67 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“I am fearful that this new rule . . . will
transform what is meant to provide an expedited ‘summary’ procedure into a full-blown
paper trial on the merits.”). Justice Brennan goes on to state the burden that the plaintiff will
bear at the pretrial stage because of this heightened evidentiary standard:
It is hard for me to imagine that a responsible counsel, aware that the judge will be
assessing the “quantum” of the evidence he is presenting, will risk either moving
for or responding to a summary judgment motion without coming forth with all of
the evidence he can muster in support of his client’s case.
Id. at 267.
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evidentiary standard when ruling on a motion for summary judgment.102 In
doing so, the Court was equating the summary judgment motion to that of a
directed verdict.103
By equating the evidentiary standard at summary judgment to that of
judgment as a matter of law, the Court held that a nonmoving party must
“shoulder[] a trial evidentiary standard” at the pretrial stage.104 The Court
stated that the difference between the two motions was merely a
“procedural” timing issue, because summary judgment motions are made
before trial and decided on documentary evidence, while judgments as a
matter of law are made at trial and decided on admitted evidence.105
Although some commentators have noted the significant differences
between the quality and completeness of the record at the pretrial and trial
phases with disapproval, others have embraced the equated standards as
true to the purpose and function of summary judgment.106
3. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.:
No Doubt Left—The “Slightest Doubt” Standard Extinguished
In Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,107 the final
case of the trilogy, Zenith Radio Corporation, an American corporation
producing televisions sets, brought an antitrust action against the Japanese
company Matsushita.108 Zenith alleged that Matsushita had entered into a
scheme to sell its televisions at an expensive price in Japan while selling its
televisions at a low, fixed price in the United States in an effort to drive
Zenith out of the American market.109
The issue for the Supreme Court was whether Zenith had established a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Matsushita had entered into a
conspiracy.110 The Court reaffirmed that the dispute must be genuine and
that the nonmoving party “must do more than simply show that there is

102. Id. at 254 (majority opinion).
103. Id. at 250.
104. Mullenix, supra note 59, at 451.
105. Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251).
106. Compare Kennedy, supra note 59, at 232–34 (arguing that there are significant
differences between prejudging the evidence at the summary judgment stage and at trial),
and D. Michael Risinger, Another Step in the Counter-Revolution: A Summary Judgment on
the Supreme Court’s New Approach to Summary Judgment, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 35, 37–39
(1998) (positing that summary judgment creates a “special problem” for judges because the
record is not finalized and the judge must make a determination of what the record would
look like at trial and then apply the sufficiency standard, and also that the Court disregarded
significance of the cost of preparing this evidentiary record pretrial), with BRUNET & REDISH,
supra note 27, § 6:4, at 148 (arguing that the “fundamental . . . purpose of summary
judgment is to avoid an unnecessary trial” and that “[t]he motion would hardly be
performing its intended function if courts were to show greater leniency toward the
nonmovant in ruling on a summary judgment motion than in ruling against a party who
moves for a directed verdict”).
107. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
108. See id. at 576–78.
109. See id. at 577–78.
110. See id. at 585–86.
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some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” thereby rejecting the
“slightest doubt” standard.111
Evaluating the record, the Court held that the court of appeals erred and
that summary judgment should have been granted for Matsushita because a
predatory pricing conspiracy would be “unlikely to occur” and was
irrational.112 The Court reasoned that “in light of the absence of any
rational motive to conspire, neither [defendants’] pricing practices, nor their
conduct in the Japanese market, nor their agreements respecting prices and
distribution in the American market, suffice to create a ‘genuine issue for
trial.’”113
Along with putting to rest the “slightest doubt” standard, the Matsushita
decision affirmed the Court’s willingness to use summary judgment.114
The net intent and effect of the 1986 trilogy was to send the message to the
lower courts that they should be much more comfortable about granting
summary judgment than they had been under the Adickes precedent and the
“slightest doubt” regime.
D. Post-Trilogy Summary Judgment Decisions
This section discusses three important post-trilogy summary judgment
decisions where appellate courts assessed de novo audiovisual evidence—
musical recordings, works of art, and videotape, all considered part of the
objective record—in deciding summary judgment motions.
1. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.: The Court Listens to Rap Music
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,115 a landmark case regarding
copyright infringement, is recognized for its revitalization of the copyright
law doctrine of “fair use.”116 However, it is also notable for the Court’s
111. See id. at 586 (emphasis added).
112. Id. at 590.
113. Id. at 597.
114. BRUNET & REDISH, supra note 27, § 6:4, at 140. Matsushita is also notable because
the Court evaluated Zenith’s expert’s testimony and found it unpersuasive, a role
traditionally reserved for the fact-finder. See id. § 6:4, at 141 (“[T]he question is not whether
the Court finds [plaintiffs’] experts persuasive . . . ; it is whether, viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to [plaintiffs], a jury or other fact finder could reasonably conclude that
[defendants] engaged in long-term, below-cost sales.” (quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 606)
(White, J., dissenting)); see also Mullenix, supra note 59, at 459 (“Such language suggests
that a judge hearing a defendant’s motion for summary judgment in an antitrust case should
go beyond the traditional summary judgment inquiry and decide for himself whether the
weight of the evidence favors the plaintiff.” (quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 600) (White, J.,
dissenting)). For further reading on the role of expert testimony in summary judgment, see
Bobak Razavi, Admissible Expert Testimony and Summary Judgment: Reconciling Celotex
and Daubert after Kochert, 29 J. LEGAL MED. 307 (2008).
115. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
116. See Pierre N. Leval, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose: Justice Souter’s Rescue of Fair Use,
13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 19, 19 (1994); Robert P. Merges, Are You Making Fun of
Me?: Notes on Market Failure and the Parody Defense in Copyright, 21 AIPLA Q.J. 305,
305 (1993). The fair use doctrine states that certain copyrighted materials can be used
without infringing upon the author’s rights. See Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use
Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1105 (1990). The idea was first articulated by Justice
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heavy reliance on the record in deciding a motion for summary judgment,
including direct analysis of music and rap lyrics by the Supreme Court.117
In 1989, rap group “2 Live Crew” released a rap version of Roy
Orbison’s 1964 hit song “Oh, Pretty Woman.”118 Acuff-Rose, who owned
the copyright to the original song, brought an action against the group for
copyright infringement.119 2 Live Crew had asked Acuff-Rose for
permission to parody the song; Acuff-Rose refused permission, but 2 Live
Crew recorded and released the song anyway.120 Acuff-Rose alleged that
“2 Live Crew’s music was substantially similar in melody to ‘Oh, Pretty
Woman’ and the lyrics of the first verse are substantially similar to that of
the original version,” and in response, Campbell moved for summary
judgment.121 The district court noted that before evaluating the claim on its
merits, it must decide whether the case was appropriate for summary
judgment, and although Acuff-Rose contended that issues of material fact
made summary judgment inappropriate, the court held that it had sufficient
facts to decide the issue as a matter of law because the evidence included
“copies of the songs, correspondence and affidavits.”122
In order to decide the case on the merits of the substantive law, the
district court listened to and compared the two songs, including the lyrics,
musical devices such as drum beat and base riff, and the musical key of the
song.123 Evaluating the song for these and other factors, the court granted
summary judgment for the defendant, holding that 2 Live Crew’s song was
a parody constituting permissible fair use.124
However, the Sixth Circuit reversed the trial court’s decision.125 The
intellectual property doctrinal issue was simple: 2 Live Crew claimed that
their song was more than a mere imitation of the Roy Orbison song, and
that both the words and music of the composition were “classic
parodies.”126 Acuff-Rose asserted that 2 Live Crew’s version was only a
copy of the original, and that “even a listener without musical training
would readily discern” that 2 Live Crew’s song was modeled after the
original.127 The court of appeals held that although it could view the song
Story in Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901), and later codified
in 17 U.S.C. § 107. Id. at 1105–06. Essentially, the fair use doctrine limits the power of
copyright protection as long as a court finds that the copyrighted material is being used for
“generally educational or illuminating purposes,” which includes criticism and commentary,
and which a court determines on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 1110–11.
117. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583.
118. Id. at 572.
119. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 754 F. Supp. 1150, 1151–52 (M.D. Tenn.
1991), rev’d sub nom. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. 972 F.2d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992),
rev’d, 510 U.S. 569.
120. Id. at 1152.
121. Id. Acuff-Rose also claimed that 2 Live Crew’s version of “Oh, Pretty Woman” was
inconsistent with good taste and would lessen the value of the copyrighted original. Id.
122. Id. at 1153.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1158–59.
125. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 972 F.2d at 1439, rev’d, 510 U.S. 569.
126. Id. at 1433.
127. Id.
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as a parody of “white-centered popular music,” its imitation of the original
song was too substantial to be justified as a parody.128 The court therefore
concluded that 2 Live Crew’s song was outside of the protection of the
parody defense and denied summary judgment.129
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine if 2 Live Crew’s song
was a parody and therefore protected as fair use under the 1976 Copyright
Statute.130
Holding that the court of appeals gave “insufficient
consideration . . . to the nature of parody in weighing the degree of
copying,” the Supreme Court reversed.131 Noting that no bright-line rule
existed in determining parody and that the doctrine called for a case-by-case
analysis, the Court examined the pertinent factors.132 This examination
required the Court to compare the two audio recordings and lyrics in order
to determine the “purpose and character of the use” and “the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole.”133 The Court stated that it must evaluate 2 Live Crew’s “Pretty
Woman” for “whether a parodic character may reasonably be perceived.”134
Comparing the two works, the Court held that 2 Live Crew’s song
“reasonably could be perceived as commenting on the original or criticizing
it.”135
In support of this assertion, the Court included the lyrics of both songs in
the appendices to its opinion.136 As to the amount and substantiality of the
portion copied, the Court held that 2 Live Crew’s song “departed markedly”
from the original and produced “otherwise distinctive sounds.”137
Ultimately, the Court remanded the case because of an infirmity in the
record.138 Nevertheless, the Court clearly based its findings regarding the

128. Id. at 1435 n.8.
129. Id. at 1439.
130. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 574–75. The statute provides that when analyzing fair use,
the factors to be considered shall include:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such
finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.
Id. at 576–77 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. IV)).
131. Id. at 572.
132. Id. at 577–78.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 582.
135. Id. at 583.
136. See id. at 594–96.
137. Id. at 589.
138. Id. at 590–94. The Court held that 2 Live Crew failed to adequately address the
fourth factor of the fair use inquiry—“the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work,” which it was instructed to do upon remand. Id. at 590
(quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107 (4) (1988 & Supp. IV)).
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substance of the songs on its own direct understanding and interpretation of
the songs after listening to them.139
2. Rogers v. Koons: Art Critics Sitting on the Second Circuit
Rogers v. Koons,140 a 1992 Second Circuit case decided on cross-motions
for summary judgment, is another fairly recent example of appellate judges’
willingness to evaluate the record directly, in this instance with respect to
contemporary art.141 In Rogers, a commercial photographer brought an
action against famed artist Jeff Koons for copyright infringement.142
Rogers had taken a photograph of a client with his wife and eight German
shepherd puppies.143 “Puppies” became part of Rogers’s catalog, and he
exhibited the piece a number of times.144 Rogers eventually licensed
“Puppies” to a company that produced notecards and postcards, and the
company produced approximately 10,000 notecard prints of “Puppies.”145
Koons created his sculpture, “String of Puppies,” based off of a
“Puppies” notecard as part of a gallery exhibit called the “Banality
Show.”146 Koons instructed sculptors in Italy to copy the photograph when
creating the sculpture.147 The puppies of the sculpture were painted various
shades of blue, their noses bulbously enlarged, and flowers were added to
the hair of the human figures.148
Koons admitted that he had based his large sculpture on a photograph
taken by Rogers, used without permission, but he claimed that it was a work
of parody, protected under the fair use exception to copyright
infringement149 (and later validated by the Supreme Court in Campbell).150
The Second Circuit found that there was no dispute of material fact

139. See id. at 593–94. It is interesting to note that the Court’s analysis of the record by
direct interpretation, specifically the meaning and intent of rap lyrics, is not limited to civil
cases (as examined in this Note) but has been extended to criminal cases. See Adam Liptak,
Chief Justice Samples Eminem in Online Threats Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2014, at A14.
The Court recently heard oral arguments for Elonis v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014),
addressing the question of whether prosecutors had proven the defendant’s intent through his
lyrics, and if his lyrics could constitute “true threats,” outside of First Amendment
protection. Id. Chief Justice Roberts quoted lyrics from Eminem in which Eminem seems to
threaten to drown his wife, and then the Chief Justice asked the government lawyer if
Eminem could be prosecuted for them. Transcript of Oral Argument at 47–48, Elonis, 134 S.
Ct. 2819 (No. 13983).
140. 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992).
141. Id. at 303–06. This foray into art criticism by the legal system did not go unnoticed
by the art world, and the issues of the case could be seen as echoing the controversy
surrounding Koons generally: Is he a genius or a commercially driven imposter? See
Constance L. Hays, A Picture, a Sculpture and a Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1991, at B1.
142. Rogers, 960 F.2d at 303–04.
143. Id. at 304.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 304–05.
148. Id. at 305, 308.
149. Id. at 308–12.
150. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
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regarding the fair use exception.151 The court based this holding on the
record before it, which included postcard-sized black and white
photographs of both works.152 Central to this holding was the question of
“the amount and substantiality of the work used,” which Koons claimed did
not exceed the level permitted by the fair use doctrine.153 The court
declared that “[h]ere, the essence of Rogers’ photograph was copied nearly
in toto, much more than would have been necessary even if the sculpture
had been a parody of plaintiff’s work.”154 The court concluded that “it is
not really the parody flag that appellants are sailing under, but rather the
flag of piracy.”155 Accordingly, the Second Circuit granted summary
judgment in favor of Rogers.156
3. Scott v. Harris: The Videotape Wrinkle
In 2007, the Supreme Court decided Scott v. Harris relying on a police
chase videotape in the trial record as a basis for granting summary
judgment.157 In Scott, Victor Harris alleged an excessive force violation
when Deputy Timothy Scott, pursuing Harris’s vehicle, hit the rear of
Harris’s car in an effort to end a high-speed car chase.158 When Scott hit
Harris’s car, Harris lost control of his car and was flipped off the road,
rendering him a quadriplegic.159
To determine whether Scott used excessive force, the district court first
examined the question of “whether the officer[’s] actions are ‘objectively
reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting [him],
without regard to [his] underlying intent or motivation.”160 After analyzing
the facts in the light most favorable to Harris, the district court held that
given the nature of Harris’s offense, among other factors, a reasonable factfinder could determine that it was unreasonable for Scott to believe that
Harris posed a threat to others and that it was unreasonable for Scott to
pursue Harris in a high-speed chase and eventually to bump him.161
151. Rogers, 960 F.2d. at 309.
152. Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125 HARV.
L. REV. 683, 721 (2012).
153. Rogers, 960 F.2d at 310–11.
154. Id. at 311.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 314. Later commentators contended that the works were substantially different
and that Koons’s sculpture should be considered a parody. See Tushnet, supra note 152, at
721 (commenting that the photograph was the size of a postcard, and the sculpture was
“larger than life and garishly colored”); see also Hays, supra note 141 (explaining the debate
around Koons’s creation, including details added to the sculpture, and the ongoing
divisiveness of Koons’s work).
157. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380–81 (2007).
158. Id. at 375.
159. Id.
160. Harris v. Coweta Cnty., No. CIVA 3:01CV148 WBH, 2003 WL 25419527, at *4
(N.D. Ga. Sept. 25, 2003) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989)), aff’d, 433
F.3d 807 (11th Cir. 2005), rev’d sub nom. Scott, 550 U.S 372.
161. Id. at *4–5. The district court considered it a “central fact that guide[d]” this case
that Harris’s crime precipitating the chase was driving seventy-three miles per hour in a
fifty-five miles per hour zone. Id. at *5. Similarly, Scott relied heavily on an earlier crash
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Having established excessive force in violation of the U.S. Constitution,
the court moved on to evaluate Deputy Scott’s assertion of qualified
immunity, the pertinent question being “whether Harris’s rights were
clearly established—that is, whether it would have been clear to a
reasonable officer that Scott’s conduct was unlawful.”162 The court
recognized that the law clearly established that the level of force
appropriate to employ when pursuing a fleeing suspect depended on the
underlying crime the suspect was believed to have committed.163 Because
Scott did not know the underlying charge against Harris when he pursued
him, and because the court must view the evidence in Harris’s favor, the
court held that there were sufficient differences of material fact precluding
summary judgment, necessitating a trial by jury.164 The Eleventh Circuit
affirmed this decision, holding that a jury could reasonably believe that
Scott hitting Harris’s vehicle was a case of excessive force and that the law
regarding the use of deadly force was sufficiently established to preclude
qualified immunity for Scott.165
The Supreme Court disagreed.166 The Court framed the question on
appeal as “[c]an an officer take actions that place a fleeing motorist at risk
of serious injury or death in order to stop the motorist’s flight from
endangering the lives of innocent bystanders?”167 Writing for an eight-toone majority, Justice Scalia noted that when a defendant moves for
summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity, the first question
a court must answer is: “Taken in the light most favorable to the party
asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated
a constitutional right?”168 Beginning this inquiry, the Court noted that
Harris’s and Scott’s versions of the facts differed substantially, which
would normally compel the Court to “view the facts and draw reasonable
inferences ‘in the light most favorable to the party opposing the [summary
judgment] motion,’” that is, Harris.169
However, in this case, a “wrinkle” in the form of a videotape of the chase
trumped this requirement.170 The Court stated that there was no
“contention that what [the videotape] depicts differs from what actually

between him and Harris in a parking lot during the pursuit to support the position that the
chase was objectively reasonable. Id. Regarding this crash, the court found that if viewing
the facts in Harris’s favor, as required in the summary judgment analysis, the inference is
that the crash was either an accident or that Scott hit Harris, as Harris had asserted, rather
than Harris hitting Scott, as was Scott’s version of the events. Id. Because the court credited
Harris’s assertions as the nonmoving party, the court did not infer that Harris was driving
aggressively. See id.
162. Id. at *6 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201–02 (2001)).
163. Id. (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1985)).
164. Id.
165. Harris v. Coweta Cnty., 433 F.3d 807, 814–15, 820–21 (11th Cir. 2005), rev’d sub
nom. Scott, 550 U.S. 372.
166. Scott, 550 U.S. at 386.
167. Id. at 374.
168. Id. at 377 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)).
169. Id. at 378 (quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)).
170. Id.
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happened,” and that the video “clearly contradicts” Harris’s story.171 The
Court described the videotape as showing Harris’s car “racing” down the
road in “the dead of night,” driving “shockingly fast” and resembling “a
Hollywood-style car chase of the most frightening sort.”172 Based on the
Court’s viewing of the videotape, the Court held that Harris’s version of the
events was “blatantly contradicted by the record,” so much so that no
reasonable jury could believe him.173 The Court held that Harris’s version
of the facts was “utterly discredited” and that the facts should be viewed in
“the light depicted by the videotape.”174 Therefore, it was no longer
appropriate to adopt Harris’s version of the facts, despite the usual
summary judgment procedure.175
Addressing the question of the objective reasonableness176 of Scott’s
actions as required by the Fourth Amendment analysis, the Court held that
“it is clear from the videotape that [Harris] posed an actual and imminent
threat to the lives of any pedestrians who might have been present, to other
civilian motorists, and to the officers involved in the chase.”177 The Court
concluded that Scott’s actions were reasonable, holding that, as a rule, a
“police officer’s attempt to terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase that
threatens the lives of innocent bystanders does not violate the Fourth
Amendment, even when it places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious
injury or death.”178 The Court held that Scott was entitled to summary
judgment and reversed the court of appeals’ decision.179 Notably, the Court
included a link to the videotape in a footnote to its opinion, stating that the
Court was “happy to allow the videotape to speak for itself.”180
Justice Stevens alone dissented, noting that he did not view the videotape
in the same light that the majority did and neither did the judges on the
district court and court of appeals. Based on these disparate views of the
facts, Justice Stevens believed that the videotape was best viewed by the
jurors.181
E. Commentary on Summary Judgment Through Scott v. Harris
Commentary on the cases discussed above is helpful in understanding the
impact of these decisions on the current summary judgment jurisprudence,
particularly the 2013 cases that are discussed in Part II. This section
discusses some of the legal commentary available.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 379–80.
173. Id. at 380.
174. Id. at 380–81.
175. Id. at 380.
176. Once a court determines relevant facts and inferences—drawn in favor of the
nonmoving party—the objective reasonableness of an officer’s conduct is strictly a matter of
law, to be decided by a court, not a jury. Id. at 381 n.8.
177. Id. at 383–84.
178. Id. at 385–86.
179. Id. at 386.
180. Id. at 378 n.5.
181. See id. at 389–97 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

3364

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

1. Thoughts on the State of Summary Judgment
Commentators have agreed that the trilogy encouraged the use of
summary judgment as a method of resolving claims and that the elucidation
of the standard made it easier for defendants to win the motion.182 Some
legal scholars have criticized this change, most notably Arthur R. Miller183
and Suja A. Thomas.184 Professor Miller notes that the summary judgment
motion “has taken on an Armageddon-like significance; it has become both
the centerpiece and end-point for many (perhaps too many) federal civil
cases.”185 Miller fears that the scope of what judges consider to be a
“genuine dispute as to any material fact” has been reduced, and that cases
that should go to trial and be submitted to a jury are being dismissed.186 On
the other hand, courts have expanded what can be decided “as a matter of
law.”187 In sum,
a motion designed simply for identifying trial-worthy issues has become,
on occasion, a vehicle for resolving trial-worthy issues. . . . The effect is
to compromise the due process underpinnings of the day-in-court
principle and the constitutional jury trial right without any empirical basis
for believing that systemic benefits are realized that offset these
consequences.188

Similarly, Professor Thomas has argued extensively that summary
judgment is unconstitutional because of the Seventh Amendment right to a
jury trial for civil litigants.189 Thomas further contends that summary
judgment violates the core principles of the common law: (1) “the jury or
the parties determine the facts;”190 (2) “a court would determine whether
the evidence was sufficient to support the jury verdict only after the parties

182. See Chen, supra note 36, at 58 (“These cases reflect the Court’s desire to enhance
judges’ use of summary judgment in eliminating claims before trial, and have arguably led to
a greater capacity for resolving cases in this manner.”); Issacaroff & Loewenstein, supra
note 36, at 73–74 (calling the trilogy a “weapon to the arsenal designed to check the spread
of litigation” and stating that the Court “significantly expanded the applicability of summary
judgment”). But see Friedenthal, supra note 61, at 787 (commenting that none of the
decisions have been overly “clear and precise”). Friedenthal also notes that although the
trilogy should generally encourage summary judgment, their effect could be limited because
of the dissents to each opinion and the history of the Court “deciding one summary judgment
case one way, only to return later with an opinion leaning the other way.” Id. at 771.
183. See generally Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and
Trials on the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 286 (2013); Miller, supra note 88.
184. See generally Suja A. Thomas, Summary Judgment and the Reasonable Jury
Standard: A Proxy for a Judge’s Own View of the Sufficiency of the Evidence?, 97
JUDICATURE 222 (2014) [hereinafter Thomas, Reasonable Jury]; Suja A. Thomas, Why
Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139 (2007) [hereinafter Thomas,
Unconstitutional].
185. Miller, supra note 183, at 311.
186. Id. at 311–12.
187. Id. at 312.
188. Id.
189. Thomas, Unconstitutional, supra note 184, at 140.
190. Id. at 159–60.
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presented evidence at trial, and only after a jury rendered a verdict;”191 and
(3) “a jury, not a court, decided a case that had any evidence, however
improbable, unless the moving party admitted all facts and conclusions of
the nonmoving party, including the improbable facts and conclusions.”192
2. Viewing the “Objective Record”: Specific Concerns About Images,
Audiovisual Evidence, and Judicial Interpretation
The use of photographic or other pictorial evidence has also attracted
attention from commentators.193 Hampton Dellinger argues against their
inclusion in Supreme Court opinions, cautioning that pictures are especially
dangerous because of their assumed neutrality and accuracy.194 Dellinger
asserts that written opinions are subjected to analysis and skepticism that
purportedly objective visual evidence in the record is not.195 Even if an
image is not purposely manipulated in any way, visual images have an
immediate impact on a viewer, oftentimes affecting subjective emotions.196
Dellinger argues that “[p]ut simply, a visual attachment, like the words that
precede it, should be viewed as an opinion.”197 Quoting Justice Holmes, he
warns that “[i]t would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only
to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial
illustrations.”198
Professor Nancy Marder objects to Dellinger’s proposition that images
should not be included in Court opinions, contending that images can be
especially helpful to readers when the Justices explain (1) why they selected
the included images and (2) how they interpret what the images depict.199
Weighing the advantages and harms of using pictures in opinions, Marder
concludes that on balance the practice should continue (as she assumes it
will), but that “[t]he use of images should convey information that words
alone cannot convey. The point is to foster discussion and debate, not to
obscure it.”200 While Dellinger fears that the Justices (like the readers of
their opinions) will be led astray by their visceral reactions to images,201

191. Id. at 160.
192. Id.
193. See generally Hampton Dellinger, Words Are Enough: The Troublesome Use of
Photographs, Maps, and Other Images in Supreme Court Opinions, 110 HARV. L. REV 1704
(1997); Nancy S. Marder, The Court and the Visual: Images and Artifacts in U.S. Supreme
Court Opinions, 88 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 331 (2013).
194. Dellinger, supra note 193, at 1707.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1708.
197. Id. at 1710.
198. Id. (quoting Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903)).
199. See Marder, supra note 193, at 332.
200. Id.
201. Dellinger, supra note 193, at 1707 (noting that the “manipulable properties of
attachments—including color, angle, size, and perspective, as well as the inevitable
exclusion of critical context—can individually or in combination result in a particularly
subjective version of the ‘facts’”). Dellinger goes on to suggest that “[t]he Court’s reliance
on these atypical depictions may contribute, in turn, to the formulation of questionable legal
arguments and conclusions.” Id.
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Marder implicitly approves of the Justices using them to inform their
“understanding of the case, just as the briefs and oral argument did.”202
The 2007 Scott decision has also received extensive treatment in the legal
community.203 Professors Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman’s article in
response to Scott sought to find what the video really says when allowed to
“speak for itself” by showing it to 1350 viewers of various backgrounds.204
Although a substantial majority agreed with the way the Court viewed the
tape, many viewers did not, and by categorically considering those views
“unreasonable,”205 the authors argue that the Court (1) denied those citizens
the opportunity to sit on a jury and possibly change the views of fellow
jurors, (2) delegitimized the Court’s own holding to the subcommunity who
perceived the facts differently than the Court did, and (3) pushed the
“unreasonable” viewers to the position of “defeated outsiders.”206
Kahan and his coauthors further argue that social sciences teach us that
while we are aware of other people’s cognitive biases, “our power to
perceive it in ourselves tends to be quite poor. We thus simultaneously
experience overconfidence in the unassailable correctness of the factual
perceptions we hold in common with our confederates and unwarranted
contempt for the perceptions associated with our opposites.”207
The authors hypothesized that the theoretical grounds on which the
viewers would “see” the tape differently were the culpable control model of
blame, the theory of identity-protective cognition, and cultural cognition of
risk.208 The culpable control model of blame theory asserts that people
attribute blame to others when their actions are viewed as voluntary and
However, people tend to perceive
result in harm to another.209
“voluntariness” when someone is acting outside of social norms and that
there is “a subconscious desire to form blame attributions that accord with
moral evaluations of the agent’s character or lifestyle.”210 Similarly,
identity-protective cognition theory proposes that individuals belong to selfdefining groups, therefore adhering to the factual beliefs widespread within
the group, and, as a means of “psychological self-defense, . . . [individuals]
process information in a selective fashion that bolsters beliefs dominant
within their self-defining groups.”211 Likewise, cultural cognition of risk
theory posits that people shape their factual beliefs about risk to conform to
202. See Marder, supra note 193, at 358.
203. See generally Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v.
Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837 (2009); Thomas,
Reasonable Jury, supra note 184; Howard M. Wasserman, Video Evidence and Summary
Judgment: The Procedure of Scott v. Harris, 91 JUDICATURE 180 (2008).
204. See Kahan et al., supra note 203, at 841.
205. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 308 (2007) (“Respondent’s version of events is so
utterly discredited by the record that no reasonable jury could have believed him.”
(emphasis added)).
206. Kahan et al., supra note 203, at 841–42.
207. Id. at 842–43.
208. See id. at 851–52.
209. See id.
210. Id. at 852.
211. Id.

2015]

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AUDIOVISUAL EVIDENCE

3367

their “cultural evaluations of putatively dangerous behavior,” which results
in people “believ[ing] that behavior they find noble is also socially
beneficial (or at least benign) and behavior they find base is also socially
harmful.”212
The survey supported these theories of group cognition of how various
viewers would see the tapes, and although the majority of the viewers
agreed with the Court’s holding that the police were reasonable in using
deadly force in Scott, it is significant that the minority who disagreed were
not statistical outliers, but rather “connected by a core of identity-defining
characteristics,” as were those who “formed a view of the facts most
unequivocally in line with those of the Scott majority.”213
Ultimately, the authors recommend that a judge engage in a “mental
double check” when ruling on a motion for summary judgment and imagine
the juror that would disagree with the judge’s conclusion that there was no
genuine dispute of material fact.214 If no specific juror comes to mind, it is
probably fair to decide the motion in the view of Kahan and his
coauthors.215 In cases where the judge can picture the dissenting jurors
with “identity-defining characteristics,” such as “demographic, cultural,
political, or otherwise[, the judge] should stop and think hard. Due humility
obliges [the judge] to consider whether privileging her own view of the
facts risks conveying a denigrating and exclusionary message to members
of such subcommunities. If it does, she should choose a different path.”216
Professor Naomi Mezey builds upon the cognitive shortcomings of
viewers recognized in the Kahan study and argues that “courts and legal
actors lack a critical vocabulary of the visual, and without visual literacy,
they are more likely to be unduly credulous in the face of images.”217
Critical of the view that the video “speaks for itself,” Mezey offers a telling
counterexample to Scott of how visual literacy on the part of attorneys can
overcome a viewer’s initial response to a powerful video.218 She does this
by using the Rodney King case, in which a video of white officers beating
King, an African American man, was broadcast widely.219 Most viewers
believed that the video spoke for itself, and in the subsequent criminal case
against the officers, the prosecutors presented the video as central evidence
in their case.220 In response, the defense attorneys presented a counter
narrative of the event by showing parts of the video in slow motion and still

212. Id.
213. Id. at 879.
214. Id. at 898.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 898–99. Professor Thomas presents a similar argument, suggesting that judges
may not adequately be able to determine what a reasonable jury may find, and that the rules
committee should further study this issue. See Thomas, Reasonable Jury, supra note 184, at
227.
217. Naomi Mezey, The Image Cannot Speak for Itself: Film, Summary Judgment, and
Visual Literacy, 48 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2014).
218. See id. at 18–21.
219. See id.
220. See id. at 18–19.
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images.221 By presenting these visual details not seen in the real time
video, the defense was able to imply that the whole video was
misleading.222 This technique reframed what the “truth” of the image
was—like an instant replay in a sports game—and presented the narrative
of the truth as the defense wanted it told.223 Mezey concludes that “[t]he
jury acquitted the officers involved in the Rodney King beating because the
defense employed a more sophisticated visual literacy,” and, although this
manipulation of the images “did not make them right, . . . it made them
better lawyers.”224
Regardless of the literacy of those using and viewing video, video will
only become more predominant in the legal context given modern
technological trends. As noted by Professor Howard Wasserman, the
ubiquity of video recording devices could be a powerful tool for all litigants
in civil rights enforcement, potentially allowing the public to hold the
government accountable for officer misconduct.225 Recognizing that
recorded evidence is important both at the “front end”—the public’s
recording of police activity—and at the “back end”—the recordings’
evidentiary use—Wasserman proposes that the right of individuals to
videotape police actions should be protected under the First Amendment,
and that recordings should be used as proof in civil rights litigation with an
understanding of video’s probative and prejudicial value.226
II. CONFLICT IN THE SUPREME COURT’S 2013 TERM
Having explored the use of summary judgment in the courts to date, Part
II examines two notable cases decided during the Supreme Court’s 2013
Term, Tolan v. Cotton and Plumhoff v. Rickard, and the subsequent federal
cases that have relied heavily on them. Both cases were decided on
summary judgment in the lower courts and subsequently vacated or
reversed by the Supreme Court.227 Both cases were brought by plaintiffs
alleging excessive force by police officers in violation of the Fourth
Amendment where the officers moved for summary judgment based on the
doctrine of qualified immunity.228 Commentators have noted that the
judgments appear irreconcilable because in Tolan, the Court ruled against a
police officer in a qualified immunity case for the first time in ten years,229
“arguably signal[ing] a major change in attitude.”230 In Plumhoff, however,
221. See id. at 19.
222. See id. at 20.
223. See id.
224. Id.
225. Howard M. Wasserman, Orwell’s Vision: Video and the Future of Civil Rights
Enforcement, 68 MD. L. REV. 600, 611 (2009).
226. See id. at 661.
227. Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1865, 1868 (2014); Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S.
Ct. 2012, 2016–17 (2014).
228. Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 1865, 1868; Plumhoff, 134 S. Ct. at 2016–17.
229. See Baude, supra note 8.
230. Ed Brunet & John Parry, Guest Post: Brunet and Parry on Tolan v. Cotton, CIV.
PROC. & FED. CTS. BLOG (May 8, 2014), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/civpro/2014/05/

2015]

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AUDIOVISUAL EVIDENCE

3369

the Court overruled the lower courts and upheld the officer’s qualified
immunity and, “to put it simply, . . . gave the plaintiff no quarter.”231
The Court’s analysis in Tolan was particularly noteworthy because after
both lower courts had concluded that there was no genuine dispute of
material fact and that the case could be decided on summary judgment, the
Court remanded the case with the (not so gentle) reminder that when
deciding a summary judgment motion based on qualified immunity, it is the
summary judgment requirement that the evidence be viewed “in the light
most favorable to the [nonmoving] party” that guides the qualified
immunity query.232 The Court held that it was imperative that courts
import facts into their analysis viewed in the appropriate manner and that
they must not conduct the qualified immunity inquiry using facts crediting
the defendant officer’s position.233 In this case, the lower courts had done
just that, according to the Tolan Court.234 When the Court correctly viewed
the facts in the light most favorable to Tolan, it held that there were
disputes, therefore making the case inappropriate for dismissal at the
pretrial stage.235
In contrast, both the district court and court of appeals in Plumhoff had
held that the genuine dispute of material facts surrounding the
circumstances of the Plumhoff car chase precluded summary judgment, but
the Supreme Court analyzed the facts of the case in three paragraphs,
finding no dispute that would merit a trial.236 The Court did not
acknowledge the plaintiff’s assertions of factual disputes, seemingly in
contrast to the direction it gave in Tolan.237
Part II.A looks at the Court’s opinion in Tolan and its application of
summary judgment, and Part II.B examines Plumhoff. Finally, Part II.C
briefly discusses subsequent federal cases that have relied heavily on Tolan
or Plumhoff, making note of the effect that video (or the lack thereof) had
on the courts’ analyses.
A. Tolan v. Cotton: Testimonial Disputes
Robbie Tolan brought an action against police sergeant Jeffrey Cotton for
excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.238 Cotton shot
guest-post-brunet-and-parry-on-tolan-v-cotton.html; see also Kennerly, supra note 8
(“Frankly, I don’t think there’s a way to reconcile Tolan with Plumhoff on the legal
principles involved. Both cases presented multiple factual issues that should have been
resolved by a jury, and thus summary judgment should not have been granted in either.”);
Howard M. Wasserman, Mixed Signals on Summary Judgment, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2015) (asserting that the Court’s handling of Tolan and Plumhoff was
“procedurally confounded”).
231. Kennerly, supra note 8.
232. See Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 1866 (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,
157 (1970)).
233. See id.
234. See id.
235. See id. at 1866–67.
236. See Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2016–17, 2024 (2014).
237. See id. at 2021–24.
238. Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 1863.
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Tolan three times, and one bullet punctured Tolan’s lung and lodged in his
liver.239 Cotton moved for summary judgment based on qualified
immunity.240 The Supreme Court related the facts of the case, based on
testimonial accounts, as follows.
At approximately 2 a.m. on December 31, 2008, police officer Edwards
was patrolling Bellaire, Texas.241 Edwards observed a sport utility vehicle
turn quickly down a residential street and park in front of the home
belonging to Bobby and Marian Tolan, Robbie Tolan’s parents.242 Edwards
entered the license plate number of the SUV into a computer in his squad
car, but he entered an incorrect digit, which coincided with that of a stolen
vehicle.243 This led Edwards, as well as the rest of the police units that had
been automatically notified by the squad car computer, to believe that
Edwards had identified a stolen vehicle.244
Meanwhile, Tolan and his cousin Anthony Cooper had exited the car and
were heading toward the Tolans’ residence, where Tolan lived with his
parents.245 Edwards exited his car and drew his pistol, accused Tolan and
Cooper of stealing the car, and ordered them to the ground.246 Tolan
protested, explaining that it was his car but did lie down on the front porch
of his home.247 At this point, Tolan’s parents came out to the front yard in
their pajamas.248 Tolan’s father told Tolan and Cooper to comply with
Edwards’s orders and to be quiet, and they did.249
Tolan’s parents then explained to Edwards that Tolan was their son, that
Cooper was their nephew, and that this was their home and car.250 With
Tolan and Cooper on the ground, Cotton arrived at the scene and drew his
pistol, and Edwards informed Cotton that Tolan and Cooper were the
suspects.251 Tolan’s mother told Cotton that this was her home and that the
car belonged to her and her husband.252 Cotton then told Mrs. Tolan to
stand against the garage door, to which she responded, “[A]re you kidding

239. Id. at 1864; Ed Lavandera, Questions Surround Shooting of Baseballer’s Son,
CNN.COM (Jan. 8, 2009, 2:21 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/01/08/baseballer.shot/
index.html.
240. Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 1863.
241. Id.
242. Id. The lower court record includes the names of Tolan’s parents, Marian and
Bobby Tolan, as well as his cousin, Anthony Cooper. See Tolan v. Cotton, 854 F. Supp. 2d
444, 449 (S.D. Tex. 2012), aff’d, 713 F.3d 299 (5th Cir. 2013), vacated, 134 S. Ct. 1861.
243. Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 1863.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. “Tolan’s father explained, with his hands in the air, ‘[T]his is my nephew. This
is my son. We live here. This is my house.’ Tolan’s mother similarly offered, ‘[S]ir this is
a big mistake. This car is not stolen. . . . That’s our car.’” Id. (quoting Record at 2059,
2075, Tolan, 134 S. Ct. 1861).
251. Id. at 1863–64.
252. Id. at 1864.

2015]

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AUDIOVISUAL EVIDENCE

3371

me? We’ve lived her[e] 15 years. We’ve never had anything like this
happen before.”253
Mrs. Tolan and Cooper testified that, at this point, Cotton grabbed Mrs.
Tolan and slammed her against the garage, causing her to fall, and leaving
bruises on her arms and back for days.254 Tolan also testified that Cotton
pushed his mother.255 According to Cotton’s testimony, he escorted
Tolan’s mother to the garage door, and she told him not to touch her.256
Tolan testified that when he saw his mother pushed, he rose to his
knees.257 Cotton and Edwards testified that Tolan rose to his feet.258 There
is no dispute that at this point Tolan exclaimed, from about fifteen to twenty
feet away, “[G]et your fucking hands off my mom.”259 Cotton then fired
three shots at Tolan with no verbal warning.260
The district court granted summary judgment for Cotton, holding that
“although there are disputes about details and interpretations of the facts,
there are no disputes of material fact.”261 Further, the court found that,
given the facts of the situation, Cotton’s actions were objectively reasonable
and therefore not in violation of the Fourth Amendment.262 The Fifth
Circuit affirmed, holding that Tolan did not meet his burden to establish
that a genuine dispute of material fact existed as to whether an objectively
reasonable officer in Cotton’s situation would believe that deadly force was
necessary.263 Therefore, the court held that Cotton did not violate a clearly
established right.264
Tolan appealed from the judgment and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari and reviewed the record.265 In its opinion, the Court announced
that “[i]n articulating the factual context of the case, the Fifth Circuit failed
to adhere to the axiom that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment,
‘[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable
inferences are to be drawn in his favor.’”266 The Court went on to state that
this rule is “not a rule specific to qualified immunity; it is simply an
application of the more general rule that a ‘judge’s function’ at summary
judgment is not ‘to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter
but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.’”267 In making
the determination of whether there is no genuine dispute of any material
253. Id. (quoting Record at 2077, 1465, Tolan, 134 S. Ct. 1861).
254. Id. Mrs. Tolan supplied photographic evidence of the bruises. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. (quoting Record at 1928, Tolan, 134 S. Ct. 1861).
260. Id.
261. Tolan v. Cotton, 854 F. Supp. 2d 444, 451 (S.D. Tex. 2012), aff’d, 713 F.3d 299 (5th
Cir. 2013), vacated, 134 S. Ct. 1861.
262. Id. at 477.
263. Tolan, 713 F.3d at 305–06.
264. Id.
265. Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 1863.
266. Id. (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)).
267. Id. at 1866 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249).
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fact, a court must view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the
opposing party.”268 Because the context of the situation is very important
in determining a qualified immunity case, the Court pointed out that courts
must be careful not to import genuinely disputed facts as part of the case’s
“context.”269
The Court identified four facts that the appellate court had imported into
their analysis in favor of the moving party.270 First, the Fifth Circuit
credited Cotton’s testimony that the shooting scene was dimly lit and that
the front porch light was decorative, rather than illuminative, contrary to
Tolan’s father’s testimony.271 Further, the court also failed to consider the
two flood lights from the police cruisers and the motion-activated front
lights that Cotton had testified were lit, as well as Tolan’s testimony that he
was not in darkness when he was shot.272 Second, the Fifth Circuit held
that Mrs. Tolan was agitated and out of control and did not credit her
testimony that although she repeatedly asserted to the officers that a mistake
had been made, she was not agitated or aggravated.273 Third, the Fifth
Circuit concluded that Tolan was “shouting” and “verbally threatening”
Cotton when Tolan said, “[G]et your fucking hands off of my mom,”
despite Tolan’s testimony that he was not screaming and that his words
were not a threat.274 Fourth, the Fifth Circuit inferred that Tolan was
moving to intervene and credited Cotton’s testimony that Tolan was on his
feet, crouching, rather than on his knees, as Tolan testified, at the time he
was shot.275 In sum, the Fifth Circuit credited the evidence of the party
seeking summary judgment and failed to credit key evidence presented by
Tolan.276
The Court concluded:
The witnesses on both sides come to this case with their own perceptions,
recollections, and even potential biases. It is in part for that reason that
genuine disputes are generally resolved by juries in our adversarial
system. By weighing the evidence and reaching factual inferences
contrary to Tolan’s competent evidence, the court below neglected to
adhere to the fundamental principle that at the summary judgment stage,
reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of the nonmoving
party.277

The Court vacated the decision and remanded it to the Fifth Circuit.278
Revisiting the case, the Fifth Circuit denied Cotton’s motion for summary
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Id. (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970)).
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judgment on the basis that there was a genuine dispute of material fact and
remanded the case to the district court.279
Tolan shows that, despite the shifting of standards resulting from the
1986 trilogy, courts are still required to credit the nonmoving party’s
testimony and deny summary judgment when a reasonable jury may find in
the plaintiff’s favor. A case such as Tolan, in which all evidence is based
on the testimonial accounts of witnesses to the event, is reminiscent of
Adickes (which, perhaps not coincidentally, the Tolan Court cited for the
proposition that a court must view the evidence “in the light most favorable
to the opposing party”).280 Tolan exemplifies an instance where adherence
to the summary judgment procedure laid down by well-settled case law is
pivotal to the determination of the action.
B. Plumhoff v. Rickard: Video in the Record
About three weeks later, the Court issued its decision in Plumhoff v.
Rickard,281 seemingly in direct conflict with Tolan. In Plumhoff, the Court
held that defendant Vance Plumhoff was entitled to summary judgment
based on qualified immunity, reversing the lower courts’ holdings.282
Plumhoff, like Scott, involved a car chase where Officer Plumhoff pursued
Donald Rickard; the record included video footage of the incident.283 After
a traffic stop for a broken headlight, Rickard attempted to evade the police
by fleeing in his car.284 Rickard was eventually cornered by the police in a
parking lot, and police shot into the car fifteen times to prevent Rickard’s
further escape, resulting in Rickard’s and his passenger’s deaths.285 In its
very brief discussion of the facts of the case, the Supreme Court did not
refer to the video footage directly, but the lower courts discussed its
evidentiary value, and the parties referred to it extensively in oral
arguments.286
The district court had denied Plumhoff’s motion for summary judgment,
holding that the officer’s conduct was not objectively reasonable in the

279. Tolan v. Cotton, 573 F. App’x 330, 330 (5th Cir. 2014). The case is currently set to
go to trial on September 14, 2015. Robbie Tolan Case Against City of Bellaire Set for
September 2015, KHOU.COM (Aug. 27, 2014, 4:26 PM), http://www.khou.com/story
/news/local/2014/08/27/robbie-tolan-case-against-city-of-bellaire-set-for-sept2015/14692155/.
280. See supra Part I.B.2; see also supra note 268 and accompanying text.
281. 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014).
282. Id. at 2017.
283. See Estate of Allen v. City of W. Memphis, Nos. 05-2489, 05-2585, 2011 WL
197426 (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 20, 2011), aff’d, 509 F. App’x 388 (6th Cir. 2012), rev’d sub nom.
Plumhoff, 134 S. Ct. 2012; Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, 19, 21–22, 28, 30, 34, 36–38,
45, 51, 55, Plumhoff, 134 S. Ct. 2012 (No. 12-1117).
284. See Plumhoff, 134 S. Ct. at 2017.
285. See id. at 2017–18.
286. See generally Plumhoff, 134 S. Ct. 2012; Estate of Allen, 2011 WL 197426; Estate of
Allen, 509 F. App’x at 393, rev’d sub nom. Plumhoff, 134 S. Ct. 2012; Transcript of Oral
Argument at 12, 19, 21–22, 28, 30, 34, 36–38, 45, 51, 55, Plumhoff, 134 S. Ct. 2012 (No. 121117).
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context, and finding disputed material facts regarding the circumstances.287
Specifically, the lower court found four facts in dispute. First, Plumhoff
asserted that Rickard had tried to hit him with his car, and Rickard’s estate
contended that he never made such an attempt.288 The district court noted
that no evidence of Rickard hitting Plumhoff’s cruiser or another cruiser
was captured in the video footage.289 Second, after this alleged incident,
the police officers could be heard on the videos saying that Rickard was
then guilty of aggravated assault, a felony.290 Rickard’s estate disputed
whether there were felony charges at this time, and no evidence of the
aggravated assault was on the video.291 Third, as the chase continued,
Rickard made a right turn and contact occurred between Rickard’s vehicle
and a police cruiser, causing Rickard’s vehicle to spin into a parking lot.292
After this, Plumhoff asserted that Rickard turned his vehicle directly toward
Plumhoff’s car and hit it head-on.293 Rickard’s estate disputed this and
argued that his vehicle was still propelled by the momentum of the crash
when this contact occurred and that the momentum caused this collision.294
The fourth disputed event occurred shortly after this collision: at this point
in the chase, the police cruisers had formed a semi-circle around Rickard’s
vehicle in an attempt to cut off any means of escape (there was a building
behind Rickard).295 Rickard reversed his vehicle, and Plumhoff and
another officer, Evans, exited their vehicles and approached Rickard.296
Evans pounded on the passenger side window of Rickard’s vehicle with his
gun in his hand.297 The wheels of Rickard’s vehicle were spinning, and the
vehicle made contact with a second police car.298 Plumhoff asserted that
Rickard was “revving” the engine, causing this contact, but Rickard’s estate
stated that the vehicle was rocking back and forth, which the court should
not consider as “revving.”299
Analyzing the question of whether the officers’ actions were objectively
reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, the
district court held that the undisputed facts did not support a finding that it
was objectively reasonable for the officers to use deadly force.300 The court
held that the officers were not in danger when they fired the shots into
Rickard’s car because none of them were in danger of being hit by
Rickard’s vehicle, no one believed or suspected that Rickard was armed,
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See Estate of Allen, 2011 WL 197426, at *10.
See id. at *2.
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See id.
See id.
See id. at *3.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at *8.

2015]

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AUDIOVISUAL EVIDENCE

3375

and Rickard had been stopped for a broken tail light.301 Additionally,
although the defendants argued that Rickard engaged in felonious activity
during their pursuit, the court recognized that these facts were disputed.302
Viewing the videotape of the pursuit, and citing Scott for the proposition
that “on a motion for summary judgment, the court may view the facts in
the light depicted by videotapes,” the trial court stated: “The objective
evidence here, the videos of the chase, would not support a reasonable
person in concluding that there were aggravated assaults. Therefore, the
officers’ conduct was not objectively reasonable, even from the officers’
perspective.”303
The court further asserted that the defendant was equally guilty of the
dangerous driving behaviors that he attributed to Rickard, which could have
been prevented had the chase been terminated.304 The district court
clarified that “dangerous conduct that was solely the product of engaging in
a high-speed chase cannot serve as the foundation for deadly force.”305
Further, the disputed facts regarding the aggression of Rickard’s driving
precluded finding in the defendant’s favor that his use of force was
objectively reasonable because the facts must be interpreted in the light
most favorable to Rickard.306
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision.307 Noting the case’s similarity
to Scott, it nevertheless distinguished the facts of the case at hand.308 The
Sixth Circuit differentiated the case by noting that in Scott, Harris was
fleeing at high speed with the potential to harm innocent bystanders when
the deadly force was used, whereas Rickard was surrounded by police and
at a virtual stop when they opened fire on him.309 Additionally, in Scott the
police used a maneuver that they knew had the potential to cause serious
harm but did not necessarily guarantee it, and in this case the police officers
shot fifteen times at close range, all while being aware that there was a
passenger in the car.310
In sum, the Sixth Circuit held that the case at hand was distinguishable
from Scott because, after viewing the video, the court could not
conclude that it provides clear support for either the plaintiff’s or the
defendants’ version of what occurred[, especially in regard] to the degree
of danger that the officers were placed in as a result of Rickard’s alleged
conduct. Unlike in Scott, we cannot conclude that the officers’ conduct
was reasonable as a matter of law.311

301. See id.
302. See id.
303. See id. (citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380–81 (2007)).
304. See id.
305. See id. (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9–11 (1985)).
306. See id.
307. Estate of Allen v. City of W. Memphis, 509 F. App’x 388, 393 (6th Cir. 2012), rev’d
sub nom. Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014).
308. Id. at 391.
309. Id. at 391–92.
310. Id. at 392.
311. Id.
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Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision.312
Plumhoff appealed to the Supreme Court, which held that Plumhoff’s
behavior was objectively reasonable both under the Fourth Amendment and
in light of clearly established law.313 The Court relayed the facts of the
case in three paragraphs, citing to the district court’s decision and finding
that Rickard was “swerving through traffic at high speeds,” and that, when
cornered in the parking lot by the police officers, Rickard’s wheels were
spinning, indicating that he was using the accelerator.314
Analyzing the reasonableness of the chase, the Court compared the chase
to that in Scott, finding that there was no reason to decide this case
differently.315 That same assertion was made during oral arguments by
Plumhoff’s counsel that “[j]ust as in Scott v. Harris, the videos in many
ways speaks [sic] for itself,” and that “[t]he video in many ways—in every
way, in [his] opinion, shows that this [chase] was dangerous.”316 The Court
also found Rickard’s driving “outrageously reckless,” holding that “Rickard
was obviously pushing down on the accelerator” when he was cornered in
the parking lot.317 Further, according to the Court, the “record conclusively
disproves” Rickard’s claim that the chase was over when the officers fired
at Rickard.318 In oral arguments, Justice Breyer noted that “when [he]
look[ed] at the film, [he] thought well, sure, [Rickard’s] going back to the
highway,” and although Rickard’s counsel argued that the police knew that
the chase was over, Justice Breyer “didn’t see any evidence showing that
Concluding its analysis of the Fourth
preferred or otherwise.”319
Amendment reasonableness inquiry, the Court held that given the
circumstances, “all that a reasonable police officer could have concluded
was that Rickard was intent on resuming his flight and that, if he was
allowed to do so, he would once again pose a deadly threat for others on the
road.”320 The Court held that “it is beyond serious dispute” that Rickard
caused a grave safety risk to the public, and like in Scott, “the police acted
reasonably in using deadly force to end that risk.”321
The Court went on to hold that Plumhoff would be entitled to summary
judgment under the “clearly established” law prong of the analysis, as
312. Id. at 393.
313. Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2017 (2014).
314. Id. (quoting Estate of Allen v. City of W. Memphis, Nos. 05-2489, 05-2585, 2011
WL 197426, at *3, *8 (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 20, 2011), aff’d, 509 F. App’x 388, rev’d sub nom.
Plumhoff, 134 S. Ct. 2012).
315. Id. at 2021.
316. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 283, at 12.
317. Plumhoff, 134 S. Ct. at 2021.
318. Id. at 2021–22.
319. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 283, at 12. Justice Breyer commented in
his concurrence in Scott that “watching the video footage of the car chase made a difference
to [his] own view of the case,” and he recommended that readers view the video as well.
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 387 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer also noted that
“the video makes clear the highly fact-dependent nature of this constitutional determination.”
Id.
320. Plumhoff, 134 S. Ct. at 2022.
321. Id.
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well.322 Because as of the date of the event “it was not clearly established
that it was unconstitutional to shoot a fleeing driver to protect those whom
his flight might endanger,” the Court held that Plumhoff was entitled to
qualified
immunity
because
the
“lengthy,
high-speed
pursuit . . . indisputably posed a danger both to the officers involved and to
any civilians who happened to be nearby.”323
Plumhoff, like Scott, demonstrates that the Court at times conclusively
decides summary judgment motions, even in cases when the lower courts—
or a dissenting Justice—find the facts in dispute and accordingly better left
for trial.324 In Part III, this Note contends that the Court confidently arrived
at this conclusion based on its own perception of the facts, made possible
because of the video record of the events in controversy.
C. The Video Effect: Opinions Relying on Tolan and Plumhoff
Because Tolan and Plumhoff were so recently decided, only a handful of
federal cases have relied on them extensively. However, a brief survey of
these decisions shows the role that video evidence often plays in courts’
decisions and the effects these cases have already had.
1. The Tolan Cases
In Bibbs v Allen,325 Jerry Bibbs brought a complaint against Officer
Allen, claiming that during a routine traffic stop, Allen tasered Bibbs
repeatedly and without justification. Although Allen admitted that he
tasered Bibbs, the facts of the event were “hotly dispute[d]” by the
parties.326 Before analyzing the disputed event, the district court noted that
although Allen’s police car was equipped with an in-car video system, it
was not working the morning of the encounter.327 Based on the testimonial
divergence, and heeding Tolan’s directive to view the facts in the light most
favorable to the party asserting the injury, the court declined to grant
summary judgment to the defendant.328
In Garcia v. Dutchess County,329 police allegedly used excessive force
against James J. Healy, Jr., eventually resulting in his death.330 The
altercation took place in Healy’s home, with no cameras present, and the
court held that material disputed facts precluded deciding the motion at the
summary judgment stage.331 The court quoted Tolan for the two-pronged
qualified immunity inquiry, and specifically that “courts may not resolve
322. Id. at 2022–23.
323. Id. at 2023 (emphasis added).
324. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
325. No. 13-cv-10362, 2014 WL 3956127 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 13, 2014).
326. Id. at *1.
327. Id. at *1 n.1.
328. Id. at *4.
329. No. 11-cv-1466 (SHS), 2014 WL 4116959 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2014).
330. Id. at *1. The claim was brought by Denise Ann Garcia, the administrator of
Healy’s estate and mother of his children. Id.
331. Id.
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genuine disputes of fact in favor of the party seeking summary
judgment.”332 Additionally, the court quoted Tolan’s direction that when
conducting the qualified immunity analysis on a summary judgment
motion, “courts must take care not to define a case’s ‘context’ in a manner
that imports genuinely disputed factual propositions.”333 Comparing the
facts of the case as construed most favorable to the plaintiff, the court held
that qualified immunity was inappropriate.334
The final recent case that heavily relied on Tolan in its analysis is King v.
Glanz.335 Donald Francis King was an unarmed mentally ill man who was
shot and severely injured by sheriffs after they were called to his home for a
The record consisted of testimony from
domestic disturbance.336
eyewitnesses, including the deputy sheriffs at the scene and various
neighbors, who provided conflicting accounts regarding whether King’s
hands could be seen, whether it would have been possible for King to be
hiding a long gun under his coat, and whether King threatened to shoot the
deputies.337 After reviewing these factual disputes, the court noted that
Tolan had “recently reiterated that it is reversible error for a court to weigh
the evidence or resolve any disputed issues in favor of the moving
party,”338 and that “reaching factual inferences that conflict with the nonmovant’s evidence is contrary to the ‘fundamental principle that at the
summary judgment stage, reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of
the nonmoving party.’”339 The court also quoted Tolan’s reminder that
“witnesses on both sides come to [the] case with their own perceptions,
recollections, and even potential biases. It is in part for that reason that
genuine disputes are generally resolved by juries in our adversarial
system.”340 Because of the conflicting witness testimony and factual
disputes, the court denied summary judgment, holding that a jury must
determine the facts.341 The court further acknowledged that in order to
grant summary judgment for the sheriffs, it would have to resolve disputed
facts in the sheriffs’ favor (specifically, that the sheriffs had reason to
believe that King was hiding a long gun), which would be inappropriate
under summary judgment procedure.342
2. The Plumhoff Cases
In Godawa v. Byrd,343 the court granted summary judgment for Officer
Byrd after Edward and Tina Godawa alleged excessive force resulting in
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.

Id. at *5 (quoting Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014)).
Id. at *13 n.13 (quoting Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 1861).
Id. at *15 (citing Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 1866).
No. 12-CV-137-JED-TLW, 2014 WL 2805313 (N.D. Okla. June 20, 2014).
Id. at *1.
See id. at *1–2.
Id. at *3 (citing Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 1866–68).
Id. (quoting Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 1868).
Id.
See id. at *7.
See id. at *8.
No. 2:12-CV-170 (WOB-JGW), 2014 WL 3809781 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 1, 2014).
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the death of their son, Michael Godawa.344 After oral arguments, the court
asked the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing the Supreme Court’s
decision in Plumhoff.345
Byrd, who was patrolling on bicycle, had questioned Godawa, who was
in a vehicle, if he had been drinking.346 Once Byrd approached Godawa the
officer turned on his lapel camera and recorded their interactions.347 The
parties agreed that the lapel video recorded the facts of the events, and that
the facts were therefore undisputed.348 The parties disputed only the
conclusions, making the matter appropriate for resolution on crossmotion.349
Relying on the lapel video, the court held that the evidence established
that Godawa backed his car over Byrd’s bicycle, almost hitting Byrd, and
then continued to drive, knocking Byrd onto the hood of the car.350 The
court noted that the impact is not actually seen on the video but was
heard.351 After this, “in what was clearly a split-second judgment,” Byrd
fired at Godawa through the passenger window.352 The court held that
Byrd’s use of force was objectively reasonable, consistent with Plumhoff’s
Additionally, the court held that the case was
precedent.353
indistinguishable from Plumhoff because “the record conclusively disproves
respondent’s claim that the chase in the present case was already over when
petitioners began shooting.”354 The court held that in this case, as in
Plumhoff, “[u]nder the circumstances at the moment when the shots were
fired, all that a reasonable police officer could have concluded,” was that
Byrd would continue his flight, endangering other drivers and
pedestrians.355 Accordingly, the court granted the officer’s motion.356
In another case involving a car chase by police officers and an allegation
of excessive force, Small v. Glynn County,357 the court cited both Tolan and
Plumhoff, and noted that Tolan required the court to take “due care to credit
contradicting evidence in favor of the Plaintiffs and draw evidentiary
inferences in favor of the Plaintiffs as the nonmoving party.”358 However,
the court was blunt about the importance of the video to its decision,
stating:

344. Id. at *1, *3, *8.
345. Id. at *1.
346. Id.
347. Id. at *1 n.3.
348. Id. at *1 n.2.
349. Id.
350. Id. at *4.
351. Id. at *2.
352. Id. at *4.
353. Id.
354. Id. at *6–7 (quoting Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2021–22 (2014)).
355. Id. at *7 (quoting Plumhoff, 134 S. Ct. at 2021–22).
356. Id. at *8.
357. No. CV 212-115, 2014 WL 4928877 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 30, 2014), aff’d sub nom.
McGehee v. Glynn Cnty., No. 14-14456, 2015 WL 1214252 (11th Cir. Mar. 18, 2015).
358. Id. at *1.
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Very few facts are actually up for dispute. This is because the Court has
had the ability, duty really, to watch and hear this tragedy from the
perspective of no less than four separate dashboard cameras. Rather than
flatly accept any attorney’s characterization of the events, the Court has
watched the videos a multitude of times.359

The court stated that “[t]he videos capture []better than any brief ever
could[]” the tense moments of the chase.360 In this case, the low-speed
chase ended in the death of the driver, Caroline Small, after she was shot by
a police officer.361
The court noted that the plaintiff argued that a jury could infer from the
video evidence that Small had no specific intent to harm anyone during the
chase and that her flight was a result of the officers’ chase.362 However, the
court held that
[e]ven inferring that Small’s ultimate desire was escape and viewing the
videos in that light, the videos document at multiple junctures why
reasonable officers would have believed that in her reckless attempt to
avoid capture, she would hurt them with her car. The videos as a whole
show she was determined to continue to elude police . . . . [T]he videos
support an objectively reasonable conclusion that probable cause existed
to believe Small was using her car as a weapon.363

Comparing this video evidence to the facts of Plumhoff, the court granted
qualified immunity to the officer.364
In contrast, the court in Luna v. Mullenix365 came to the conclusion that
summary judgment should not be granted because the video in a police
chase supported the plaintiff’s version of the events.366 Noting that Scott
instructed courts to “view facts in accordance with the video,” the court
held that the videotapes supported the plaintiff’s assertion that a reasonable
jury could find that the plaintiff’s driving did not pose an immediate danger
to other officers or drivers.367 The court noted that the qualified immunity
analysis requires a court to analyze “particular facts,” facts that the Court in
Plumhoff found supported the use of deadly force.368 The facts of this case,
as viewed on the videotapes, were distinguishable from Plumhoff (among
other cases where deadly force was objectively reasonable), and therefore
summary judgment was inappropriate.369
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III. THE REALITY OF JUDGE AS VOYEUR: BUT IS IT A GOOD THING?
The Court’s holdings in Tolan and Plumhoff appear to be in conflict.370
The Court held that Tolan was inappropriate for summary judgment
because of genuine disputes of material fact and firmly stated the
importance of viewing all evidence and inferences in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party.371 By contrast, the Plumhoff Court
confidently granted the officer’s motion for summary judgment, reversing
the lower court’s denial of the motion.372 Notably, findings of disputed
facts that could affect the qualified immunity analysis had influenced the
lower court decisions.373 This Note proposes that the difference in the
decisions is attributable to the type of evidence presented in each case. The
testimonial “he said, she said” evidence in Tolan made the case
inappropriate for summary judgment, while in Plumhoff, the audiovisual
evidence disposed of disputed facts and allowed the case to be decided by
motion. The purported factual disputes of Plumhoff were reconciled
because the Justices were able to observe the car chase that was the basis
for the action with their own eyes and ears by watching and listening to the
police dash camera videos that had recorded it.374 This Note shows that the
appellate judges’ review of and reliance on audiovisual evidence is firmly
based in precedent—from Arnstein through Scott.375 Similarly, Adickes
lays the basis for Tolan, along with the tendency of appellate judges to
decline to grant summary judgment in cases that rely solely on testimonial
evidence.376 Part III discusses the contours of this argument.
As demonstrated by the post-Plumhoff decisions reviewed in this Note,377
audiovisual evidence will continue to play a significant role in courts’
summary judgment decisions.378 However, despite the precedential
appropriateness of appellate judges’ de novo review of audiovisual
evidence, its propriety should be questioned. The consequences of such
review—and the unavoidably subjective perception that judges bring to
audiovisual observation—are especially fraught in summary judgment
motions based on qualified immunity, potentially resulting in decisions with
great repercussions for civil rights litigation. Part III concludes that direct
judicial review of audiovisual evidence should, at the very least, be

370. See supra notes 227–31 and accompanying text.
371. See supra Part II.A.
372. See supra Part II.B.
373. See supra Part II.B.
374. This possibility has not gone unnoticed. See Wasserman, supra note 230, at 14
(noting that the presence of video footage as one of three proposed reasons for the Court’s
disparate treatment of Plumhoff and Tolan).
375. See supra Part I.B.1, I.D.
376. See supra Part I.B.2.
377. See supra Part II.C.2.
378. See Wasserman, supra note 225, at 601 (“The effect of this balanced proliferation of
technology is to place video recording at the heart of modern civil rights litigation and the
enforcement of constitutional liberties in controversies arising from police-public
encounters.”).
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examined and questioned by the judiciary, and that in most instances this
review should be left to a jury.
A. Tolan Was Vacated and Remanded Because, Like Adickes, All
Evidence Was Testimonial
Adickes and Tolan show that regardless of the changes in summary
judgment standards created by the 1986 trilogy, summary judgment is
inappropriate when genuine disputes of material fact exist, and these cases
illustrate that courts are especially likely to find disputes in cases where
evidence is purely testimonial. Because judges are prohibited from making
credibility determinations, cases based on “he said, she said” testimonial
evidence are difficult to decide on a pretrial motion.379 Tolan’s strong
directive reminding courts that all facts and inferences must be viewed in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party380 leads to a high
likelihood that judges will find a genuine dispute of material fact exists in
the parties’ motions, requiring a trial where those credibility determinations
can be made. Although the 1986 trilogy is generally regarded as prodefendant,381 Tolan reinforced the inappropriateness of summary judgment
in such testimonial cases and reaffirmed a plaintiff’s right to a day in court.
It is also possible that the Adickes and Tolan Courts were particularly
sensitive to the potential civil rights violations in these cases and, with only
testimonial evidence in the record, hesitant to take the decision away from a
jury who would likely view the evidence with a broader variety of outlooks,
or at least with perspectives more reflective of their respective
communities.
B. Precedent Establishes the Judicial Audiovisual Review in Plumhoff
By contrast, the precedential cases upon which the Plumhoff decision is
grounded show that courts have unhesitatingly looked to the parts of the
record that they consider objective and have freely interpreted that record
when determining summary judgment motions.382 Courts have done this
even when they are deciding a question of fact. In Arnstein, the Second
Circuit was adamant that the question of whether the songs in contention
were sufficiently similar was an issue for the jury, but the judges
nevertheless listened to the recordings themselves and found the songs
similar enough to justify a trial (upon the presumption that other elements
of the action were satisfied).383 While judicial review is necessary to
decide whether a case should be decided on a motion or whether it is trial
worthy, the Second Circuit’s decision to listen as “ordinary lay hearer[s]”384
379. See supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text.
380. See supra notes 266–68 and accompanying text.
381. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
382. See supra Part I.B.1, I.D.
383. See supra Part I.B.1. In this particular case the court found other issues necessitated
the fact-finding role of a jury as well, so the weight of the court’s decision did not fall on its
interpretation of this objective record. See supra Part I.B.1.
384. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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seems close to intruding on the role of the jury, and the opinion does not
further describe or define how judges are to listen as “lay listeners.” The
judges were not “lay listeners,” but rather highly educated jurists trained in
litigating such matters. On the other hand, although the judges were not
“lay listeners,” there is no reason to believe that they were especially
qualified to discern subtleties in musical compositions. As dissenting Judge
Clark pointed out, the “judicial eardrum” may be “peculiarly
insensitive.”385 Despite the specialized judicial knowledge that these
intellectual heavyweights possessed in the field of law, the judges were not
qualified as musical experts, and yet they eschewed the option of relying on
expert advice, which could surely have informed their decision.386 The
judges in the majority forced themselves into a illogical position: to listen
to the recordings as “lay listeners,” which they were not, while refusing
competent assistance from expert witnesses. Judge Clark’s skepticism of
his fellow judges’ ability to accurately perceive and interpret the musical
pieces for similarities echoes later criticisms volleyed at judges who use
their own perceptions to evaluate the worthiness of visual art and video.387
The “anti-intellectual and book-burning”388 rejection of the musical
expert’s assistance is analogous to the current prevalent belief that the video
“speaks for itself,”389 without need for further visual literacy or skepticism.
Although Judge Clark did not believe that the jury would have been more
qualified to evaluate the compositions, his dissent recognized that judges
may not be the most appropriate arbiters in this case.390
Similarly, in Campbell and Koons, the issue was whether the works in
question were allowable under the fair use doctrine, requiring a case-bycase analysis that could not “be simplified with bright-line rules,”391 (as is
the qualified immunity analysis), and the appellate judges went straight to
the sources when making their decisions.392 There was no discussion of
disputed facts in either case because the courts took for granted that because
they could experience the pieces of art themselves, there were no facts to
dispute.393 Both cases called for judicial analysis of whether the allegedly
infringing work was a parody of the original, and both cases involved works
in genres—rap music and contemporary art, respectively394—that may not
have been easily accessible to sitting judges. Given the collective
background of the Justices reviewing Campbell, it is not unreasonable to
suggest that they may not have been the intended audience of 2 Live Crew’s

385. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
386. See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text.
387. See supra Part I.E.2.
388. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
389. See supra note 180 and accompanying text; see also note 316 and accompanying
text.
390. See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text.
391. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
392. See supra notes 132–39 and accompanying text; supra notes 141–56 and
accompanying text.
393. See supra Part I.D.1–2.
394. See supra Part I.D.1–2.
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recording and therefore less able to evaluate the “purpose and character of
the use.”395 In this case, however, Justice Breyer and the Court recognized
the artistic merit of 2 Live Crew’s composition.396 In contrast, the Second
Circuit held against Koons,397 who was (and is) a divisive figure in the
contemporary art world.398 A conversation about the worthiness of his art
already existed,399 and Second Circuit judges were not necessarily the most
qualified viewers to weigh in on this debate. The Koons decision was
particularly poorly received, with one critic commenting that “if copyright
law won, then art lost.”400
The Scott decision was a natural progression from courts’ consistent use
of musical and visual records. Because the “objective reasonableness” of
an officer’s conduct is a question of law reserved for the court, a case can
only go to trial if the court finds the officer’s actions objectively
unreasonable, or if genuine disputes of material fact exist upon which a
court finds that a reasonable jury could find for the plaintiff.401 By holding
in Scott that the evidence must be viewed in the light depicted by the video,
the Court made it easier to decide these cases pretrial, because it gave courts
permission to view the video directly and conclude that there are no genuine
disputes based on their own perceptions of the events and therefore no need
to proceed to trial.402 Plumhoff followed in Scott’s footsteps, and although
the Court’s opinion did not comment on the use of the video in making the
decision, its language spoke definitively.403 The Court held that the driving
was “obviously reckless” and that Rickard was “obviously pushing down
the accelerator,” both conclusions considered points of dispute to the lower
395. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
396. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
397. See supra notes 155–56 and accompanying text.
398. Reviewing the Whitney’s Koons retrospective for the New York Times, Roberta
Smith wrote of Koons’s art:
Conflating Minimalism, Pop and Conceptual Art in a gift-wrapped version of
Duchamp’s ready-made, [Koons’s works] were the first of several shocks—“Is it
art? ” “Is it any good? ” “Do I love it or hate it? ”—that Mr. Koons has regularly
delivered to his expanding audience over the last four decades.
Roberta Smith, Shapes of an Extroverted Life, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2014, at C19.
399. See Carol Vogel, Think Big. Build Big. Sell Big., N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2014, at
AR1 (“Mr. Koons, who has been making art out of kitsch since the 1980s, has been slammed
by some critics as glibly calculating, even as others have praised him.”).
400. See James Traub, Art Rogers vs. Jeff Koons, DESIGN OBSERVER GROUP (Jan. 21,
2008), http://designobserver.com/feature/art-rogers-vs-jeff-koons/6467/ (arguing that
Koons’s sculpture was a piece of art independent from Rogers’s photograph, in the tradition
of Picasso). It is also worth noting that the visual evidence that the court used to compare
the pieces—two identically sized black and white photographs of the works—differed
greatly from the actuality of the pieces. See Tushnet, supra note 152, at 721. Koons’s
sculpture was a large and garishly colored sculpture, and Rogers’s a black and white
photograph. See id. Regardless of whether this would have changed the outcome of the case,
it is yet another example of deception by image.
401. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
402. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
403. See supra notes 317–20 and accompanying text; see also Mezey, supra note 217, at
4 (“[Plumhoff v. Rickard], factually quite similar to Scott v. Harris and likewise based on
video evidence, seems to ensure that the Supreme Court will continue to model its
impoverished approach to the legal interpretation of images.”).
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courts.404 Further, the oral arguments support the idea that the Court relied
on the video to inform their decision, albeit without specifying what the
Court found especially compelling or convincing about the video
footage.405
C. Problems with Judicial Review of Audiovisual Evidence
This Note asserts that the bottom line is that appellate judicial review of
audiovisual evidence is anything but the objective, neutral solution to
divisive, fact-bound, and problematic cases that courts tout it to be. As the
scholarship of Dellinger, Kahan and co-authors, and Mezey has shown,
viewers bring their own cultural, personal, and experiential filters to
viewing audiovisual evidence.406 Not only are these biased perceptions
difficult to overcome, but they are especially dangerous because they are
often undetectable to the people holding them,407 including appellate
judges. As Dellinger points out, judges educated in the law have been
taught to interpret and dissect briefs and oral arguments and therefore
approach these tools of advocacy with a healthy skepticism and with legal
knowledge of their own.408 Yet when it comes to an audiovisual record, it
is very difficult to overcome the deeply ingrained adages that “seeing is
believing,” and the power of seeing through one’s “own eyes” or hearing
with one’s “own ears” is approached with little suspicion.409 As Kahan and
his coauthors note, although people tend to be aware of other individuals’
cognitive biases, they do not perceive these biases in themselves.410
Judges’ beliefs in their own infallible powers of perception forces the
conversation back to a need to acknowledge who, as a whole, make up the
judiciary, and how such a composition may skew results in favor of one
party or another. Appellate judges are not necessarily representative of
society at large or of the jury pool.411
Direct judicial review results in two major problems. First, when judges
view the video directly and draw inferences and conclusions from it, they
are putting themselves in the role of the jury. On top of the constitutional
404. See supra Part II.B.
405. See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
406. See supra Part I.E.2.
407. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
408. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
409. See supra notes 170–78 and accompanying text; supra notes 315–23 and
accompanying text; supra Part II.C.2.
410. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
411. As of August 11, 2009, the federal judiciary (district and appellate judges) were 70
percent white male, 15 percent white female, 6 percent African American male, 2 percent
African American female, 4 percent Hispanic male, and 1 percent Hispanic female. RUSSELL
WHEELER, THE CHANGING FACE OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 1 (2009), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2009/8/federal-judiciarywheeler/08_federal_judiciary_wheeler.pdf. In the courts of appeals, the percentages were
similar: 71 percent white male, 17 percent white female, 4 percent African American male,
2 percent African American female, 4 percent Hispanic male, and 1 percent Hispanic female.
Id. The 2010 U.S Census reported a national population of 72.4 percent white, 12.6 percent
African American, and 16.3 percent Hispanic. 2010 Census Data, U.S. CENSUS 2010,
http://www.census.gov/2010census/data/ (last visited Apr. 23, 2015).
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problems with this, noted extensively by Professor Thomas,412 this prevents
the jury from functioning as it should: bringing together people from a
variety of backgrounds and perspectives and giving all jurors the
opportunity to voice their opinions and concerns, as posited by Kahan and
his coauthors.413 The second problem stemming from direct judicial review
is that judges do not approach audiovisual evidence with the visual literacy
explained by Professor Mezey.414 The judiciary seems to be not just
unaware of their own biases and preferences and the power of video to
produce powerful emotional responses, but also its potential malleability.415
Although video is becoming increasingly prevalent in daily life and in law
enforcement activities, the judiciary is not becoming any more adept at
navigating audiovisual evidence with the scrutiny and legal tools that it uses
when approaching other, more traditional forms of evidence.416
Looking at the particular problems that direct judicial review of
audiovisual evidence creates, the civil rights plaintiff would seem to be in
an especially disfavored position. The 1986 trilogy encouraged courts to
grant defendants’ motions—certainly Arnstein and Adickes would not go to
trial today. Additionally, the qualified immunity analysis also heavily
favors the officer defendant.417 Finally, when audiovisual evidence is in the
record, appellate judges—and thus far the Supreme Court has confirmed
this hypothesis418—may be more likely to view the evidence in favor of the
defendant officers. With all of these factors weighing in the defendant’s
favor, it would be important for courts to determine instances where an
unfavorable inference should be drawn against the defendant, for example,
if a police officer has video capability to record activity and chooses not to.
The issues raised by judicial review of audiovisual evidence at summary
judgment are not going away, and this Note advocates that the courts strive
to address the parameters of its use. It is simply not the case that video
“speaks for itself.”
A final illustration of audiovisual evidence’s power of persuasion comes
from the oral arguments in Plumhoff before the Supreme Court.419 The
Court challenged defense counsel regarding whether it was clearly
established law that a police officer could shoot at a suspect fleeing in a
vehicle.420 Before defense counsel could reply, Justice Scalia—perhaps in
jest—said: “My goodness, they do it all the time. You watch the movies

412. See supra notes 189–92 and accompanying text.
413. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
414. See supra notes 217–19 and accompanying text.
415. See supra notes 218–24 and accompanying text.
416. See supra Part II.C.2.
417. See Karen Blum, Erwin Chemerinsky & Martin A. Schwartz, Qualified Immunity
Developments: Not Much Hope Left for Plaintiffs, 29 TOURO L. REV. 633 (2013) (discussing
the Supreme Court’s recent decisions regarding the qualified immunity analysis and the
resulting difficulties for plaintiffs).
418. See supra Parts I.D.3, II.B.
419. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 283.
420. Id. at 51–52.
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about bank robberies, you know, it happens all the time. Are these movies
unrealistic?”421
When a Supreme Court Justice cites his experience in a movie theater to
question the propriety of a police officer’s actions, it is time to reevaluate
the use of video in court proceedings and challenge its credibility—and the
experiences that we bring with us as viewers—as we would with any other
piece of evidence.
CONCLUSION
This Note proposes that the Court decided Tolan and Plumhoff as it did
because in Tolan, the evidence was purely testimonial, while in Plumhoff,
an audiovisual record was available to the Court. Precedent shows that
deciding Plumhoff based on this audiovisual evidence was perfectly
allowable, and even preferable in some judges’ opinions.
However, reconciling the cases in this manner leads to a bigger problem
in need of examination: the propriety of direct appellate judicial review of
audiovisual evidence. This Note proposes that judges must undergo further
education regarding the near impossibility of experiencing audiovisual
evidence objectively, as well as audiovisual evidence’s malleability.
Finally, this Note concludes that more often than not, a jury should view the
audiovisual evidence, bringing to this purported objective evidence a
variety of viewpoints and perspectives. When judges view the audiovisual
evidence directly and use this evidence to decide a case on its merits at the
pretrial stage, they risk infringing on the jury’s rightful place in the
litigation process.

421. Id. at 52.

